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Thirty-Two Short Stories About
Intellectual Property
By LORIE GRAHAM* AND STEPHEN MCJOHN**
I. Introduction
In the United States, intellectual property law is usually viewed
as serving an economic policy by providing an incentive for authors
and inventors to create works. The incentive policy, however, ill fits
the actual contours of intellectual property law and how artists and
inventors use it. Adding other approaches offers a fuller explanation.
Intellectual property plays a greater role than economic theory
suggests in disclosing technology, and in serving to coordinate cultural
values in technology. Intellectual property can serve human rights
(similar to the moral rights approach in some jurisdictions) by
allowing people to control the way that their works are publicly
exploited and by allowing groups (such as indigenous peoples) to
implement rights of self-determination, education, and media. In
assessing doctrine and theory, deductive reasoning from economic or
legal principles is no more important than literary tools, like
interpretation and narrative. These points can be illustrated by some
stories.
II. Fiction Stranger than Hypothetical
A copyright hypothetical: In a novel, Atavistic Avatar, a robot
arrives on Earth in a spaceship disguised as a 1967 Cadillac. The
robot looks and behaves as much like a human as its makers could
manage, working from radio waves that reached their planet (some
decades back, to give time for the programming to reach them, a ship
and robot to be built, and to travel here). Despite their advanced
technology, the robot's makers could not muster sufficient artificial
intelligence for automatic translation of conversational speech.' The
* Lorie M. Graham is a Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School in
Boston Massachusetts, where she teaches courses on Indigenous Peoples' Rights,
Property, and International Human Rights. She holds an LL.M from Harvard Law School
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robot speaks from a vast library of canned phrases gleaned from
earthly broadcasts: "Sometimes words have two meanings." 2; ,I'M
sorry, Dave. I'm afraid I can't do that."3 ; "Don't worry about a thing,
'cos every little thing is gonna be alright." 4 Suppose the character
quoted 100 lines from 100 different songs and movies during the
course of the novel.! The novel's author could infringe 100 copyrights
(for statutory damages of at least $75,000, and possible much more)
or no copyrights, depending on how a court applied fair use.'
and a J.D. from Syracuse University. Professor Graham has served as legal consultant on
a range of matters impacting indigenous nations in the United States, such as land claims,
economic development, environmental protection, and jurisdictional disputes. She serves
on a number of committees, including the International Law Association's Committee on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Harvard University Native American Advisory
Board. She is the former director of the Harvard University Native American Program
and has been a visiting lecturer at Harvard Law School and at University of
Massachusetts-Amherst. She practiced law at Kramer, Levin in New York City, and
clerked for the Honorable Richard D. Simons of the New York Court of Appeals.
Professor Graham has served as an author for the Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian
Law and has published extensively in the areas of international human rights law and
indigenous peoples' rights.
** Prof. McJohn received his B.A. in Computer Studies and his J.D., magna cum
laude, from Northwestern University. After studying law in Germany and a federal
appellate clerkship, he practiced law in the Chicago office of Latham and Watkins and
taught at the IIT Chicago-Kent School of Law. At Suffolk University School of Law, he
teaches in the areas of intellectual property and commercial law. His scholarly interests
are intellectual property, commercial law, computer law, artificial intelligence, and
economic analysis.
1. "The consensus as far as I have experienced it among Al researchers is that
natural -language processing is extraordinarily difficult, as it could involve the entirety of a
person's knowledge, which of course is extraordinarily difficult to model on a computer."
Steven Pinker, quoted in John Seabrook, Hello HAL, THE NEW YORKER, June 23, 2008,
at 40. See also Stephen McJohn, Artificial Legal Intelligence, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241
(1998) (discussing how common sense cognitive tasks like natural language
comprehension and production have been much more difficult to emulate with computers
than abstract tasks like mathematics).
2. LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, on LED ZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic Records
1971).
3. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968) (HAL, the ship's
computer, speaking to one of the astronauts).
4. BOB MARLEY & THE WAILERS, Three Little Birds, on EXODUS (Tuff Gong
1977).
5. To really test copyright law, we could analyze possible infringement by the
makers of the robot. They worked beyond the territorial scope of U.S. copyright law, but
sent the robot within the statute's domain. The hypothetical also raises a question of first
impression: how to apply relativistic effects to the running of the term of the statute of
limitations, because Einstein's theories tell us that time runs much more slowly from the
viewpoint of one travelling near the speed of light.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010). Courts could also use other copyright doctrines, like de
minimus use.
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According to recent cases, even such minimal quotes might be
infringement. Fair use was held inapplicable, where a song
repeatedly copied the words "Bow wow wow, yippie yo, yippie yea"
from George Clinton's Atomic Dog.7 But sprinkling song lines in a
novel is different than repeating the same line throughout a song, in
an industry with established licensing for such uses. Author could
decide to rely on fair use. If risk averse,' Author could use legal
strategies to reduce the chances of infringement. Author could use
lines from just one movie or song, reducing the amount of possible
statutory damages-but raising the chance of infringement, due to
increased copying from that work. Author could just use lines from
public domain sources (pre-1920 works, government works like
judicial opinions or presidential speeches, purely factual works). But
that would mean giving up Bob Dylan for Herbert Hoover. To use
technicalities, Author could copy only from works whose copyright
has not been registered, because statutory damages would not be
available (and actual damages would be hard to prove).
Novelist Carl Hiassen independently came up with a better
solution (likely without even thinking of copyright law). In Hiassen's
Sick Puppy, one character drops the words of rock songs into
everyday conversation-but always comically wrong. His utterances
are fair use, because they take only part of fragments of the quoted
works and Hiasseen added creative expression by transforming rather
than simply quoting.) Nor is there a licensing market for
misquotations, as opposed to sampling in the recording industry."'
Beyond showing that novelists are more creative than law
professors," this gently tests a hallowed principle of copyright law.
Copyright has fair use and the nonprotection of ideas as "built-in
protections for freedom of speech" on the theory that copyright exists
to spur creativity and must give way where necessary to encourage
7. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 277-79 (6th Cir.
2009).
8. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (discussing how parties often shy away from making fair
use for fear of litigation).
9. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (discussing creative
expression and the transformation of quoted works).
10. Id. at 590-91 (discussing whether holder of copyright in song Pretty Woman would
be likely to market a rap parody version).
11. Some law professors have produced good novels. See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT,
IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW (2005); STEPHEN CARTER, THE EMPEROR OF OCEAN
PARK (2002).
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subsequent creative works.12 But the very constraints of copyright can
serve as an impetus for creativity." Constraints trigger creativity in
many ways, from censorship (from movies under the Hays code to
modern writers contending with web filters, authors can layer
meaning to defy restrictions), literary forms (from the unities in
Greek drama to poetic forms like sonnet and haiku), to the internal
constraints of a work's plot and characters. Constrained artists
sometimes can be more creative. "Deprivation is for me what
daffodils were for Wordsworth." 4 That does not counsel imposing
censorship, shrinking fair use, or putting artists in garrets. It suggests
looking beyond incentive in copyright policy. The Constitution" and
courts speaks in terms of copyright as a carrot. But that rationale
hardly fits the shape of copyright law, whose contours go well beyond
the protection necessary to encourage creation of works." Copyright
law, if it served only to provide incentives to create works, would only
apply to certain categories of works and would have real limits on
duration. But copyright automatically attaches to any work, even
works that would be created without copyright (diaries, academic
works, hobbyist software, etc.) and lasts seventy years past the
author's death. Copyright, increasingly, makes more sense as
balancing the rights of authors to control their works against the
interests of others in using the work."
12. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
13. Conversely, lack of copyright protection for fashion design evidently speeds
innovation, because designers seek to come out with new designs before the previous
generation has been copied. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VIRGINIA L. REV.
1687 (2006).
14. Attributed to Philip Larkin.
15. "The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability And Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1572-75 (2009) (discussing how copyright exceeds its incentive
rationale, and suggesting the rationale supports limiting copyright protection to
foreseeable uses).
17. On moral rights justifications for copyright, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self- Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright
as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
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III. Case of the Missing Case
Three Supreme Court cases dominate any discussion of fair use.
Sony held that it was fair use for consumers to use video cassette
recorders to time shift television programs." Harper and Row held
that it was not fair use for The Nation to quote several hundred key
words from the autobiography of former President Gerald Ford.'9
Campbell held that it could be fair use for 2 Live Crew to make a
parody version of Roy Orbison's Pretty Woman.2' Those cases are
likely to appear whenever fair use is an issue.
One case will be absent from such a discussion. In Stewart v.
Abend, 1 the Supreme Court held that it was not fair use for the
producers of Alfred Hitchcock's film Rear Window to continue
showing the film after their rights were terminated in the underlying
story, It Had To Be Murder. Stewart was decided between Sony and
Harper & Row. But appellate opinions and law review articles devote
pages of analysis to the big three, but rarely even a glancing reference
to Stewart. Stewart's fair use analysis does not appear in leading
copyright casebooks22 or supplemental texts on intellectual property
for law students.2 Sony, Harper & Row, and Campbell appear
together every time, like three musketeers. The case of Hitchcock's
film does not even make a cameo.
Fair use is a notoriously difficult doctrine to apply. Three
Supreme Court cases comprise a small set of authoritative precedent.
In such a fact-bound area, one more Supreme Court case on point
would enrich the law. Stewart has much to offer. Unlike the other
cases, Stewart involves a dispute between a copyright holder and a
licensee. Many copyright disputes involve parties that had licensing
agreements. Stewart also helps explore the boundaries of fairness.
The defendants had bargained for movie rights to the story, but lost
them through unanticipated changes in the law and the happenstance
of the author's death. Whether it would have been appropriate to
18. Sony Corporation of America v. University City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
19. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985).
20. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
21. 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990).
22. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 525-602 (Aspen Publishers, 2d ed. 2006); ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 715-847 (Foundation Press, 7thed. 2006).
23. See STEPHEN MCJOHN, COPYRIGHT: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 293-316
(Aspen Publishers, 2d ed. 2009); MARY LAFRANCE, COPYRIGHT LAW IN A NUTSHELL
293-304 (2008).
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allow them to continue showing their movie, but allow the copyright
owner to license other uses, raises interesting questions about the
"fair" in fair use.
But Stewart has disappeared, like a character in Rear Window.
As to the reason, there are several suspects. Brevity could have been
mistaken for lack of depth. The fair use discussion in Stewart is short,
but acute. Most of the opinion deals with a complex interpretation of
the copyright statute's termination provision. Maybe the audience
does not stick around for the fair use part of the opinion. Perhaps
Stewart was excluded by our taste for grouping things in three. No
more than three scientists may share a Nobel Prize. An Olympic
podium has three spots. Innumerable stories, from Harry Potter to
Huckleberry Finn, have three principal characters. Most likely,
Stewart was simply passed over in the narrative structure of case law.
In interpreting the common law, we repeat the story that we have
heard in earlier cases. In analyzing the case law on fair use, Harper &
Row left Stewart on the cutting room floor and discussed Sony.
Campbell then relied on Harper & Row and Sony. Lower courts take
their cue from the Supreme Court, and Stewart simply did not become
part of the story. Just as Rear Window reminds us we cannot always
trust our eyes, so the story of Stewart reminds us to look a little
deeper into the stories we rely on. After the parties finally resolved
their copyright dispute, Rear Window was successfully rereleased.
Perhaps Stewart's fair use analysis will likewise find a renewed
audience."
IV. The Power of Suggestion
Trademark law's distinctiveness requirement often pits
businesses against their lawyers. To market a product, the business
would like to use a name that describes the product. But a merely
descriptive term is not protectable as a trademark, so competitors can
also use that descriptive term to market their products.2 An arbitrary
or fanciful term, which has no logical connection with the product,
will be interpreted by consumers as a trademark and so is
protectable.26 But such a symbol tells potential buyers nothing about
24. For an effort to ensure that the intellectual history of ideas remain current in
intellectual property scholarship, see Michael Madison, Lost Classics of Intellectual
Property Law: 1 of 4, MADISONIAN.NET (January 1st, 2010), http://madisonian.net/2010/
01/01/lost-classics-of-intellectual-property-law- I -of-4/.
25. 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2010).
26. Qualitex v. Jacobson Products, 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995).
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the product.2 Trademark law offers a middle ground: protection for
suggestive marks, symbols which indirectly give information about
the product.28
Perhaps no industry has used the suggestive mark as skillfully as
the pharmaceutical industry. Their lawyers and marketers have
smoothly navigated the constraints of trademark law to find terms
that are attractively suggestive. Some examples:
-Claritin and Flonase, clarity and flow for allergy sufferers;
-Cardura, lending strength against high blood pressure;
-Requip, against Parkinson's disease;
-Ambien, Stilnox, and Lunesta, as respites from insomnia;
-Provigil, for sleepiness;
-Zoloft, Wellbutrin, Prozac to lift from depression; and
-Abilify, for schizophrenia.
With drugs, suggestiveness comes into play not just as a
marketing tool. The user's mental state can affect how well the user
considers the product to work. The placebo effect is strong. We
might speculate that a suggestive name could have a stronger placebo
effect than an outright descriptive name. Descriptions we can deal
with at a more conscious level, armed with the tools of skepticism and
rationality. Subtle suggestions may take hold beyond those barriers.
Suggestive marks might also have advantages in the regulatory realm.
The regulations of the United States Food and Drug Administration
bar misleading names. 29 But those regulations bar only names that
make baseless claims for therapeutic value or are confusingly similar
to drugs already on the market." To test whether one of the redolent
names above was truly misleading would require double-blind trials
of the sort used to test drugs themselves. So a legal constraint-the
bar for protection of descriptive names-provides an incentive to
create suggestive names, which may prove more valuable for other
reasons.
The mental associations involved in drug marketing can play out
to reduce trademark protection. When the patent expires on a drug,
generic manufacturers will sell substitutes. In order to win over
purchasers, a generic seller may wish to sell the drug in the same
27. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162-63.
28. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000).
29. 21 C.F.R. § 201.10(c)(3) (2010).
30. Id.
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form: the same shape tablet, in the same color. In traditional
trademark law terms, the shape and color of a tablet could be
protected as trade dress. The product is a biologically active
chemical: its chemical function does not depend on the shape of the
tablet or its color. But courts have held that the shape and color may
have lost their trademark function, just as "Aspirin" lost its
trademark function when it became the generic term for
acetylsalicylic acid.3 Because of the strong mental association the
consumer has with the familiar tablet, as well as the consumer's
suspicion that a different looking tablet will not work as well, the
shape and color could have become generic for that category of
product-or even functional, because they affect how effective the
drug will actually be for the consumer. A trademark becomes a
product.
V. Guilt by Association
Trademark law is intellectual property, but also physical
property, in a sense. Trademark protects the mental association
between a commercial item and its source. 4 The standard for
trademark infringement, like the standard for priority of trademark
ownership, is whether a challenged symbol is likely to cause confusion
or deception among potential buyers." A mark receives increasing
protection if it becomes well-known: "The more deeply a plaintiff's
mark is embedded in the consumer's mind, the more likely it is that
the defendant's mark will conjure up the image of the plaintiff's
product instead of that of the junior user."36 Famous marks receive
their own category of protection, against dilution by tarnishment or
blurring.3 Commercial parties recognize as much, speaking of
competing for brain space as they compete for shelf space in a
supermarket, just as they seek to attract "eyeballs" for ads.
Trademark rights mean ownership over the contents of a consumer's
31. See Shire U.S., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 351 (3d Cir. 2003).
32. Notably, Bayer retained its position as the leading seller despite lack of trademark
protection. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 454 n.284
(1999).
33. Glynn, supra note 32, at 454 n.284.
34. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and
Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 371, 371 n.19 (2002).
35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1114(1) (2010).
36. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2010).
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brains-in a very limited way. One can know many marks, and freely
use them-or think with them. Only use of the mark for commercial
purposes in a potentially deceptive or confusing manner infringes, so
most uses of those words remain unencumbered.
An empirical research project, nevertheless, would be to attempt
to estimate just how much of our brains have been so propertized.
Brain imaging technology is a long way from being up to such an
exact task," so proxies would be required. There are some three
hundred thousand entries in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED).
The USPTO's Trademark Electronic Search System contains over
three million marks (whether live, dead, or pending).41) That number,
however, does not represent the number of separate words used as
marks. It includes many duplicates (because the same word can be a
mark in different commercial sectors, as in United Airlines and
United Van Lines), many non-word symbols (such as designs or
coined marks), many composite marks (made up of two or more
words) and even a few sounds. Perhaps one could use a similar
method to that used in estimating the size of a person's vocabulary.
One can take a section of the dictionary and see what percentage of
the entries a person recognizes, and extrapolate that to the entire
dictionary. If Subject recognizes forty percent of the words in a
sample of the OED, then we can estimate that Subject would
recognize forty percent of the OED, or has a vocabulary of one
hundred and twenty thousand words. We could take a section of the
OED, and see how many of those words are registered as marks, to
give an estimate of how much of English has been trademarked. We
could also take the words that people recognized from a sample of the
OED, and see what percentage of those were registered marks, which
would give a rough estimate of the percentage of a person's
vocabulary that has been trademarked. But that might be
overinclusive (because the person might know that word in its literal,
rather than trademark sense) and underinclusive (because it would
38. See Owen D. Jones, Joshua W. Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall & Rene Marois, Brain
Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5
(2009). See also Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON B:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004) (arguing that in the future, "neuroscience will probably
have a transformative effect on the law").
39. Dictionary Facts, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/about/
facts. html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
40. See Trademark Electronic Search System, USPTO, http://tess2.uspto.gov/ (last
visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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leave out the many marks that are not in the dictionary, not being
words). We could start at the beginning. Linguists also make lists of
the first words acquired by children. It would be quite telling to see
what percentage of a child's first few hundred words were trademarks
(like "Barney" or "Elmo").
VI. Demons as Collateral
For some artists, copyright law seems to provide an incentive for
creative legal thinking. Woody Allen brought cases raising the issues
of whether the right of publicity applied to a celebrity look-alike 41 and
whether it applied to a celebrity non-look-alike (a photo of the
celebrity in disguise).42 Terry Gilliam successfully sued the American
Broadcasting Corporation to prevent Monty Python episodes from
being bowdlerized. 43 The case fills a gap in United States copyright
law, which provides little protection for the moral rights of artists.44
Under Gilliam, artists may sometimes be able to use that old
workhorse, contract law, to protect their work from the editor's
scissors. Gilliam was later held liable for copyright infringement for a
minor use of another's drawing in his film 12 Monkeys, an important
precedent for such issues as whether sampling from a copyrighted
song is fair use.
Annie Leibovitz created a portrait of a pregnant Demi Moore for
the cover of Vanity Fair. The producers of the film Naked Gun used
a parody of the photograph in advertising, one which substituted the
blocky head of comic actor Leslie Nielsen for Ms. Moore's. 46
Leibovitz sued for copyright infringement, but lost on the grounds of
fair use. The advertisement was held to transform the image. Rather
than preventing further publication of the parody, the lawsuit caused
it to be published much more widely. The photograph went from the
movie section of the newspaper to the front page, the National Law
Journal, copyright casebooks, classroom power points and other
41. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
42. Allen v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No. 08 CV 3179 (TPG) (KNF) (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The
case reportedly settled. See C.J. Hughes, For $5 Million, Woody Allen Agrees to Drop
Lawsuit, NEW YORK TIMES (May 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/ny
region/19allen.html.
43. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 17 (1976).
44. See ROBERTA KWALL, SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES (Stanford University Press 2009).
45. Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
46. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
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educational and reporting fair uses. The case also highlights a
contrast in comparative copyright. Where the moral rights of authors
receive greater protection than in the United States, the case might
have triggered an artist's right to prevent distortion of her work.
Another lawsuit involving Ms. Leibovitz tests the possibilities of
treating copyright as property.4 Ms. Leibovitz put up as collateral a
proverbial floating lien in the copyrights to her existing work and any
future works. In jurisdictions that grant strong recognition to moral
rights, Ms. Leibovitz might not have been able to grant such broad
rights. An artist's rights to such future works could be inalienable.
But in the United States, copyrights are treated like typical personal
property. A party can effectively put up collateral property she will
own in the future.48
The case also raises questions about enforceability. The
creditors might have the right to Ms. Leibovitz's future copyrights,
but she might not create new valuable works. From Ms. Leibovitz's
point of view, if in default on the loan, she might not have a financial
incentive to create new works that would benefit only her creditors.
But that views copyright from only the incentive rationale. Her
creative drive would continue. "An artist is a creature driven by
demons. He doesn't know why they choose him and he's usually too
busy to wonder why." 49 Without financial constraints, her purely
artistic impulses might have greater freedom. Or perhaps the
creativity of her lawyers might provide another way. If she became
an employee, her employer would be the author and therefore
copyright owner in any work she created. In short, the case shows
considerable tension between the idea of copyright as incentive for
artists and the actual forces that drive artists.
VII. Point of View
The United States Postal Service decided to issue a stamp with
the image of the Korean War Veterans Memorial, with its sculpture
47. Ed Pilkington, Annie Leibovitz Pawns Rights To All Future Work, GUARDIAN
(February 24, 2009) ("Records show she secured the loan partly against property, but also
by putting up as collateral the copyright, negatives and contract rights to every photograph
she has ever taken or will take in future until the loans are paid off.").
48. U.C.C. § 9-204(a) ("security agreement may create or provide for a security
interest in after-acquired collateral").
49. Attributed to William Faulkner.
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of soldiers on patrol."' The USPS chose a beautiful image of the
sculpture in snow." The USPS signed a licensing agreement with the
photographer, but did not seek permission from the sculptor.52 We
might expect no copyright issues, because U.S. Government works
are not copyrighted. But the sculptor was an independent contractor,
not a federal employee, so the copyright had vested in him." When
he sued for infringement, the USPS defended on the basis of fair use,
arguing that the snowy image was a transformative fair use.5
From the USPS's point of view, fair use might seem plausible.
The four statutory factors are the nature of the use, nature of the
work, the amount used, and the effect on the market for the
copyrighted work.' The photograph was itself a creative work that
added something to the work. Public sculptures commissioned by the
United States, commemorating historical events, might seem
amenable to public use. The stamp did not show all of the sculptures,
and some were partially covered in snow. The use of the sculpture on
a stamp might not cut in to other markets for the work.
From the sculptor's point of view, another picture emerges. The
United States had offered the sculptor a commission to create a work.
He agreed, but was adamant about keeping the copyright. With
respect to market effect, the United States routinely places national
monuments on stamps, an entirely foreseeable market at the time of
the agreement. The photographer made the picture as a private gift
to his father, a veteran.5 When the United States offered the
photographer a licensing fee to use the image on a stamp, the
photographer advised them that they would also need permission
from the sculptor.5 The United States did not add any creative
elements to the image (beyond adapting it for use on the stamp),
undercutting its claim of transformative use. Viewed this way,
applying fair use would hardly further the creative freedom of artists.
It would simply allow hiring parties to rewrite contracts unilaterally.
50. See Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Disclosure: one of
the authors of this article, Stephen McJohn, worked pro bono on this appeal with lawyers
for the sculptor.
51. Gaylord v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 59, 63 (Fed. Cl. 2008).
52. Id. at 64.
53. See, e.g., Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
54. Gaylord, 85 Fed. Cl. at 68-71.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010).
56. Id. at 64.
57. Id. at 65-66.
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The case illuminates the elusive nature of fair use. The fair use
framework attempts to capture the analysis in four factors. This
echoes the lawyer's term for a case: fact pattern. Fair use cases,
however, can rarely be sorted into four neat factors. The cases take
on an individual narrative logic. After several landmark Supreme
Court cases, and dozens of thoughtful lower court analyses, fair use
law can present a case with a new category of facts.
VIII. Derivative Fair Use: Piggybacking Allowed?
Photographer takes a photo of a painting hanging in a museum.
Beyond trying to just get a good rendition of the painting,
Photographer includes several other elements. She picks an angle a
little bit to the side and below the normal line of vision. She waits
until the sunlight creeps down the wall. She gets the shadow of a
viewer with head cocked and elbows akimbo. Photographer does not
have permission to take a picture, but may well be within fair
use-especially if we put our thumb on the hypothetical scale and say
that Photographer has no commercial use in mind and is simply
making a picture for an art class.
Artsypixels.com gets wind of the picture, perhaps from
Photographer's teacher. Artsypixels.com makes nice money by
putting interesting images online and selling ads alongside. If
Artsypixels.com put the image on its website, that raises the question
of fair use: in particular, the extent to which Artsypixels.com can rely
on any transformative use made by Photographer. The case law to
date has not yet addressed it, but courts have touched on related
questions. In deciding whether a use is commercial or not, courts
look to the use of the defendant. Where a copy shop was sued for
making course packs containing substantial excerpts from
copyrighted books and articles, its use was held commercial. The
copy shop could not rely on the fact that it was making the copies to
sell to students, who would be making noncommercial, education use
of the works." In Sony, the question was whether a consumer using a
video cassette recorder to time shift television programs for future
viewing was protected by fair use." The Supreme Court
characterized it as a private, noncommercial use-even though the
58. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996).
59. Sony Corporation of America v. University City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
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ultimate issue was whether the sellers of the VCR's were liable for
contributing to alleged infringement by consumers.
But whether transformative use carries over is different. Two
hypotheticals at either extreme demonstrate as much. Suppose
Parodist writes a scathing parody of Author's short story. That would
likely be fair use (although we would have to spell out the facts more
specifically to be sure). Author wisely desists from suing
Parodist-but could Author recover from any website or print
publisher that made, sold, or distributed copies, on the theory that
they were not making a transformative use, simply making copies?
Surely Parodist's transformative use rubs off a little on those that
distribute the work-or else fair use would have little meaning to
someone that did not have their own media outlet. In this case,
transformative use would seem to transfer.
As an exercise, Author writes a script for a movie she has no
intention to make, Harry Potter 8. The sequel transforms, so to
speak, the Potter saga to university life. Author writes to vent her
creative force, comment on the Harry Potter books, sharpen her
writing skills, amuse her friends, and to meet an assignment for her
class in screenwriting. That would be fair use. If her teacher sends
the script to Movie Studio, though, it surely could not make and
distribute the film, reaping millions of dollars, simply because writing
the script was fair use. So in some cases, transformative use does not
carry.
There appears, however, to be no case law on point. Certainly
many decided cases could have addressed the issue. 2 Live Crew did
not personally press the records in Campbell," and the author of The
Wind Done Gone did not have her own printing press.' But evidently
neither litigant differentiated between the roles of the parties
there-which were more closely linked than the ones in our two
hypothetical stories. There are plenty of uncharted waters in fair use.
60. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
61. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding fair use protected the author of The Wind Done Gone, a parody of Gone with the
Wind). The issue could also have been addressed, but was not, in analyzing whether the
United State Postal Service's use of another's photograph was fair use, in the case
discussed at text supra note 50.
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IX. Transformative Determinative
The Victor Sees his Fairy Gold,
Transform'd, When Won, to Drossy Mold.6
The word "transform" has taken on importance in intellectual
property law. Under Campbell," fair use is more likely to apply if a
"transformative use" is at issue. The Supreme Court, following a law
review article by Judge Pierre Leval, held that parody would often
qualify as transformative.64 Lower courts have placed even greater
importance on the term, even as they moved away from its literal
meaning.'5 Thumbnail versions of photographs, displayed by Google
to users searching for images, were held transformative-not because
there was creativity in making the small, low-resolution, and
purposefully inferior images. The use was considered transformative
because the images were used for a different purpose-to facilitate
searching for images online."6 Similarly, putting student papers into a
database for detecting plagiarism was sufficiently different from their
original use to be held "transformative."
An influential California Supreme Court case held that whether
a use was "transformative" was key to whether use of someone's
image was protected by the First Amendment from claims of
violation of the right of publicity.' A transformative work is "not
only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also
less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the
right of publicity."6  Whether the work was transformative depended
not on whether it portrayed the celebrity at issue, but whether the
work's message was to portray the celebrity or to convey the
defendant's expression."' The case has meaning for trademark law as
62. SIR WALTER SCOTT, THE POETICAL WORKS OF SIR WALTER SCOTT, Bart 305
(George S. Appleton ed., 1851).
63. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
64. Id., relying on Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105,1111 (1990).
65. See Laura Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use And Reader
Response, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 445 (2008) (suggesting that in deciding whether a work
transformative, courts look to literary theory of reader-response criticism).
66. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007).
67. See A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
68. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 387, 811 (2001).
69. Id. at 808.
70. Id. at 809.
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well, because a broad right of publicity can spill over into a
trademark-like right."
The Federal Circuit, for a time, 2 made "transformative"
determinative of whether a process is patentable.7 So enamored of
the "transformative" test was the court, that it paid little heed to
conflict with rather clear language in Supreme Court opinions. 4 As
with "transformative" in fair use, the court did not require a literal
transformation. Transformation of data about an object would be
sufficient, even if the object itself did not change in form.7
So "transformative or not" became the test for several difficult
issues in intellectual property, each involving conflicting policies. The
copyright statute provides a four factor analysis for fair use issues, but
the issue of author's rights versus rights of others to express
themselves with those works remains one of the most vexing. Despite
decades of case law on patent subject matter, the boundary between
patentable inventions and nonprotectable ideas is likewise impossible
to locate with any confidence. The conflict between the right of
publicity and rights of free expression is similarly complex. The
courts looked to the word "transform" to resolve these disparate
questions. Courts did not rely on the literal meaning of the word.
Something that "transform" connotes must make it attractive. Courts
use the phrase "magic words" disparagingly.76 Ironic, then, that
courts place so much importance on whether something is
"transformed," the classic word magicians use to describe their
illusions.
71. See Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 299-302
(2003).
72. The Supreme Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test in Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2010).
73. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding a process is only
patentable if "(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing").
74. See Stephen Mciohn, Scary Patents, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. 343 (2009)
("In short, the Federal Circuit in Bilski chose to adopt a rule that the Supreme Court had
specifically declined to make a general rule, chose to ignore the facts of the Supreme
Court cases and its own most recent case on point, and chose to set aside the statute's
definition of the word that governed the case.").
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. MacDermid Printing Solutions,
L.L.C., 525 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (in patent case: "Contrary to MacDermid's
argument, this reference did not run afoul of the MPEP by failing to use magic words. The
MPEP provision requires only that the applicant use a statement 'such as' the one
provided in Section 201.11.").
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X. How to Sue Yourself
Copyright law differs from patent law in many ways. A patent
applicant must claim her invention, submitting patent claims that
distinctly define the invention. An author need not even register a
work to have copyright. If she does register, she need merely
deposit copies of the work, without defining what elements are
protected. She need not separate her original creative expression
from the uncopyrightable elements, such as facts, ideas, and material
from other sources. She can claim copyright very easily, with the
"@" symbol on copies of the work. She can also send menacing
letters to alleged infringers, again, without spelling out what
protected elements are infringed.
So copyright lends itself to spurious claims. Publishers may put
copyright notices on books that contain material from the public
domain, whether old folk songs, government information, or literary
classics. Some justify the notice on the theory that they have added
some creative material. West Publishing even once claimed copyright
in compilations of judicial reports. West claimed not just copyright in
material that West wrote, such as keynote summaries, but copyright
in the opinions themselves, on the theory that it had creatively
added ... page numbers." Another category of spurious claims
involves cases where the works are indeed under copyright, but the
use at issue is well within the boundaries of fair use, such as snippets
of quotations used in literary analysis. Publishers are often shy of
litigation, and as copyright holders themselves often do not want to
battle for fair use of published works. Authors, filmmakers, and
other artists have often been stymied by such threats.
A number of legal theories have been brought forward to found
liability against such spurious claims." In recent cases, users of
creative works have realized that they do not need a cause of action.
They can sue themselves for copyright infringement. In legal terms,
where a party has threatened to sue for copyright infringement, the
other party can respond by instituting the action themselves, as an
action for declaratory judgment that the use at issue does not infringe
copyright. Declaratory judgment actions are a staple of patent and
77. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2010).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2010).
79. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
80. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
81. See Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes of
Action, I J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259 (1994).
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trademark litigation, where competitors often seek judicial
clarification of their disputes over more strictly commercial rights to a
market. So eager to get to court are many potential defendants that
the Supreme Court recently drew the starting line on just how much
assertion of rights by a patentee creates sufficient controversy for the
other party to go to court. If a party asserts that others are using her
intellectual property, she may have to defend that assertion in federal
court, even if she "avoids the magic words such as 'litigation' or
'infringement.'" 3 Although declaratory judgment actions have been
much scarcer in copyright, parties threatened by copyright claims
have learned that sometime it pays to file the first writ.
An adroit use of this technique involved the works of James
Joyce. The Joyce estate liberally threatened copyright infringement
actions against anyone who so much as quoted a few words from
Joyce's writings, even though such use is the very embodiment of fair
use. The threats made it difficult for those writing about Joyce to find
willing publishers. A literary scholar brought a declaratory judgment
action, winning not just a decision upholding the application of fair
use, but also an award of attorney's fees, meaning the Joyce estate
funded the litigation against itself establishing fair use of its
copyrighted works.
A bumpier path involved the adaptation of an Associated Press
photograph of Barack Obama. The adapted image was combined
with the word "Hope" in a campaign poster. After the AP discovered
that its copyrighted images had been used, it made some public
grumblings about copyright infringement. The AP showed little
interest in actual litigation because the artist had a pretty strong fair
use argument. The artist, however, filed a declaratory judgment
action. During litigation, the artist made misrepresentations about
which images he had used. Several photographs had been made of
the same occasion, from different points of view. The artist evidently
reasoned that if he had copied from a photo less similar to his final
82. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (rejecting Federal
Circuit's strict requirement that a licensee breech license agreement in order to have
jurisdiction for declaratory judgment action ).
83. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("The purpose of a declaratory judgment action cannot be defeated simply by the
stratagem of a correspondence that avoids the magic words such as 'litigation' or
'infringement."').
84. Karen Sloan, James Joyce Estate Agrees to Pay Plaintiffs Fees in Fair Use Dispute,
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (September 30, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1202434181383.
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product, then he would have made a greater transformation,
strengthening his fair use argument. The result was to open himself
up to sanctions and to undercut any remedy he was likely to
receive-in a lawsuit that need not have been brought.
This sounds like the story of a successful declaratory action and
one gone awry. But that is from a lawyer's point of view. The first
action allowed a Joyce scholar to make freer use of Joyce's writings.
The second brought much more publicity, and to an artist with a
record as a provocateur. Perhaps both were successful from different
points of view. Certainly, they emphasize that the lawyer's view of
copyright law and its incentives may be different from the artists who
create copyrighted works.
XI. Distillation to Attribution
People give intellectual property away. In recent years, this has
been somewhat formalized. Free software (known as open source
software to some) is distributed almost free of copyright." If Ada
writes some code and distributes it under the GNU General Public
License,"' she allows anyone who wants to make copies, use the
software, adapt the software and distribute the adaptations." But
Ada does not abandon her copyright. She distributes copies subject
to the license terms. Those terms are far more permissive than the
terms that accompany almost any other service or product. But they
usually do have two big requirements."' First, the taker cannot
impose restrictions on the copies of the software that she distributes.
This means that the software remains free, in the sense that it will not
be encumbered by restrictions against use, adaptation, or making
more copies. Second, if Ada is like most free software licensors, she
will require attribution. Anyone that adapts or redistributes the
software must give her credit (and avoid attributing modifications to
her, which also protects her reputation)." There has not been much
85. See Stephen McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 25
(2000).
86. See GNU General Public License, GNU, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
(last updated Oct. 9, 2010).
87. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free Software
Movement's Constitution, 42 HoUs. L. REV. 1015 (2005).
88. See Greg Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software Licensing:
Moderating the Rein over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183 (2006).
89. McJohn, supra note 85, at 34 ("Open source licenses require licensees to respect
the author's right of attribution (to get credit for her work) and her right to avoid
misattribution (not to have other people's work ascribed to her).").
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litigation involving open source licenses,"' because people tend to sue
over more monetized disputes. But the single appellate decision on
the issue held that it was copyright infringement to make copies
without the required attribution.'
The idea of free licensing has spread to other types of works. 2
The best known free license for distributing books, music and the like
is the Creative Commons license." Creative Commons made it quite
easy for artists to create intellectual property licenses. The CC
license tool showed a menu to allows an artist to tailor the permission
she gave. The artist could choose whether to allow commercial uses
of her work, whether to allow others to modify her work, and whether
to require others to give her attribution when they used her work.
After thousands of artists had used the tool, Creative Commons
dropped the no-attribution option. No one ever chose to allow his or
her work to be used without attribution.94 That suggests what is at the
core of intellectual property. Authors will cede their exclusive rights
to disseminate their work. Authors will allow others to use their
work and even modify it. Authors may allow others to make money
off their work. But few surrender the right to get credit for what they
have created-especially today, where reputation is a key economic
factor.
The CC licenses, the GPL and other commons licenses put
intellectual property in a new light. Inventors and authors can use
their intellectual property to keep their works effectively in the public
domain. The parties controlling CC and GNU also guard their own
rights of attribution. The CC license, for example, cannot be made
revocable. The CC license creation tool drafts an irrevocable license,
90. There has been more litigation about ownership of open source software. See
Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles For Evaluating Free And Proprietary Software, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 265-87 (2004) (describing history of disputes involving rights to
Linux, an open source operating system).
91. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
92. See generally Brett M. Frischmann, et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural
Environment, CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010).
93. See License Your Work, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/
choose / (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
94. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution,
95 GEO. L.J. 49, 90 (2006).
95. See Fisk, supra note 94, at 50 (2006) ("Attribution is foundational to the modern
economy. The reputation we develop for the work we do proves to the world the nature
of our human capital. Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a reputation and
intrinsically valuable simply for the pleasure of being acknowledged. Indeed, credit is
itself a form of human capital.").
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without the option for the author to authorize use of her work, but
retains the right to withdraw permission." Unlike the no attribution
option, a termination right might indeed be attractive to many
authors. The reason it is not offered is to protect the reputation of
CC licenses. If even some CC licenses were terminable, then other
creators and distributors would be less likely to rely on CC licensed
works. The GNU license likewise guards against variation, relying on
copyright. It provides:
Copyright © 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
<http://fsf.org/> Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute
verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not
allowed.
Just as manufacturers rely on trademarks and patents to craft a
market presence for their product, so free licensing organizations
control their creation. There is indeed considerable competition
among free licenses." Someone ready to give her work away could
use the GPL, a CC license, the Artistic License," the MIT License,'oo
or many others-or draft their own license. In some areas, freely
shared works may replace proprietary works. Intellectual property
law, so far, is proving key to encourage the sharing of works free of
intellectual property.
XII. La Force de FRAP
Judge: a Law Student who Marks his own Papers."
Until 2007, most federal appellate courts forbid or restricted
citation to unpublished opinions.102 After considerable debate and
96. See Before Licensing, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org
/BeforeLicensing (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
97. GNU Operating System, Gnu General Public License, Version , _2 June 2007,
GNU, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html (last updated Oct. 9,2010).
98. See Why should I use the GNU GPL rather than other free software licenses?,
GNU, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.html#WhyUseGPL (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
99. See The Artistic License, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/
licenses/artistic-license.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
100. See The MIT License, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/
licenses/mit-license.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
101. PHILLIP M. PARKER, ICON GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC., REFEREEING
WEBSTER'S QUOTATION, FATS AND PHRASES 2 (2008).
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study, the Supreme Court chose to amend the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure to allow citation of unpublished opinions,
although only opinions issued after January 1, 2007." Many federal
judges had opposed the proposed rule. The debate touched on many
levels. In terms of jurisprudence, unpublished opinions were said to
lack the precedential value of their more polished cousins. The
contrary view would be that in a case law system, a decided case is a
decided case, which stands for the holding reached. Indeed, allowing
courts to decide which decisions were precedential would allow them
to act selectively.104 At an institutional level, permitting citation of
unpublished opinions could hold courts to an appropriate standard.
At the constitutional level, the restriction raises issues of due process
and freedom of speech.1 The rule even had ramifications at the
humdrum workaday level, because citations to unpublished decisions
would create more work for courts to see whether the citations were
accurate. In addition, the rule might also cause more time to be spent
on opinions.
We can also see the question as an intellectual property issue,
one unique in American law. When a federal judge publishes an
opinion, there is no copyright. Works of the United States
government are not copyrighted.' The incentive role of copyright is
not required for such works, because federal employees are employed
to produce them. More important, giving the government control
over dissemination of its works raises troubling questions of freedom
of speech and due process.
But the rules barring citation of unpublished opinions gave
judges a degree of control of their work that goes beyond American
copyright law.11 Moral rights come in many forms, but often include
102. See, e.g., Tim Reagan et al., Citations to Unpublished Opinions in Federal Courts
of Appeal: Preliminary Report, Federal Judicial Center (2005), available at
http://www.fjc.gov.
103. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks And Staff
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2007).
104. Kenneth J. Schmier and Michael K. Schmier, Legislative Reform: Has Anyone
Noticed the Judiciary's Abandonment of Stare Decisis?, 7 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 233
(2005).
105. Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an
Unconstitutional End, 97 GEo L.J. 621 (2009).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010).
107. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L.
REv. 789 (2007) (discussing whether United States copyright law should adopt a right of
attribution, as recognized in other jurisdictions, which recognize moral rights).
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the right to prevent distortion of the work, to receive proper
attribution, to protect the integrity of the work, to control disclosure
to the public, to withdraw the work from the public, and to receive
resale royalties. United States copyright law does not provide for
such rights, other than a limited version of them applicable only to
works of visual art (itself a narrowly defined category)." United
States copyright law is usually seen as based more on economic
principles than on recognizing moral rights of artists. Fair use, a
distinctive feature of United States copyright law, often allows actions
which elsewhere would contravene moral rights-such as a parody
that distorts a work. The idea behind moral rights is that an artist's
personality is entwined with her work, so she should control how it is
presented (or not) to the public.
Rules against citing unpublished opinions had the effect of
granting such rights to, of all authors, federal judges. If an opinion
were merely copyrighted, that might prevent reproduction of the
opinion. But one could still cite the opinion, and quote any ideas or
facts or nonoriginal material from the opinion-which would add up
to a large part of the opinion. Rules against citation gave judges (at
least within their sphere) rights over attribution and control over
disclosure to the public. The less common act of withdrawing
opinions also gives judges a measure of the right of withdrawal.
The need for such rules was indeed linked to authorial integrity.
The best known statement on the rule change comes from Judge Alex
Kozinski's comment submitted in opposition:
There is simply no time or opportunity to fine-tune the
language of the disposition.... When the people making the
sausage tell you it's not safe for human consumption, it seems
strange indeed to have a committee in Washington tell people
to go ahead and eat it anyway."9
In short, many judges believed that the author is the one who
should decide how her judicial work becomes used in public. The
right of attribution, in this context, became so important that it
overshadowed-for some appellate judges, if not the Supreme Court
justices-issues with constitutional dimensions. Notably, when the
Supreme Court required courts to allow citation of unpublished
108. See 17 U.S.C. 106A (2010).
109. Letter Comments from Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules 5 (Jan. 16, 2004).
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opinions, it did so prospectively. This seems to give credence to the
judge-as-author rationale, by allowing citation only to opinions issued
after the authors had warning that they might be cited.
XIII. Our Patented Technology
Scientific principles cannot be patented. "Einstein could not
patent his celebrated law that E=mc; nor could Newton have
patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are 'manifestations
of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."'11 0
The pages of Scientific American, however, contain plenty of
references to patents. The articles often refer to patents on
applications of scientific discoveries. But patents pop up other places
as well. The biographical notes on the authors frequently list the
number of patents that they have obtained. Patents also appear in
marketing. Advertisements in every type of media tout patents
obtained on the product."' An ad for a hybrid car featured an inset
citing its "Patent No. US6687593 Regenerative Braking." 2  The
advertising agency probably did not really think the typical consumer
wanted the patent number in order to look up the patent. Citing the
patent number lent the ad a flavor of authenticity and authority, the
suggestion that the United States Patent Office, after due
examination, had attributed special qualities to this invention. The
patent marking statute allows an inventor to put her patent number
on embodiments of the invention she sells, in order to put rivals on
notice." An inventor that does not mark the product is limited in the
remedies she can recover from infringement. 114 But the requirement
is hardly necessary, for patent holders go far beyond it of their own
accord. It is a very modest patent holder that simply puts the
required notice on the product itself. Advertisements refer
conspicuously to "our patented technology," as with the hybrid's
regenerative breaking system. Such references to patents can suggest
more than the truth-in-advertising law would allow the manufacturer
110. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
111. To be more exact, patent on inventions embodied in the product. "Patents and
copyrights protect inventions and expression; they do not protect products." Mark R.
Patterson, When is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1133, 1133 (2000).
112. See Advertisement for 2008 Mercury Mariner Hybrid, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
Sept. 2007, at 41.
113. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2010).
114. Id.
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to claim. One might infer the car seller invented regenerative
breaking, but on actually looking at the patent cited, it becomes
quickly clear that it simply covers one type of regenerative
breaking."'
The power of patents may also subtly suggest other things to
consumers. But the grant of a patent, strictly speaking, goes to none
of the qualities of the product. A consumer is likely to be interested
in whether a product is safe, efficient, better than other products on
the market, pleasant to look at, and so on. Whether a product is
patented depends on none of those qualities. Inventor is entitled to a
patent on her wooden combination lock if it is new, useful, and
nonobvious. If it has not been done before, has some specific utility,
and would not have been obvious to one working in that area of
technology, she gets her patent. The lock may not work better than
ones on the market, and need not even work well at all. It need not
be more efficient than ones already available. It may be hazardous,
or used for fraudulent purposes. But somehow the many invention
stories we have heard suggest to us that a patented product must
somehow be new and better. No one would buy a book because it is
copyrighted (indeed, freedom from copyright protection technology is
a definite selling point for music, games, and many other copyrighted
works). But patents sell.
Patents resemble merit badges in other areas. Patents receive
increasing attention and weight, from advertising to academia, even
as the many problems of patents have become better known.116 A
story in Popular Mechanics about an inventor mentions his "more
than 100 patents.""' Scientific American author biographies often
give as much space to the patents awarded a scientist than to more
traditional credentials, such as publication in peer-reviewed journals.
Perhaps it is more effective to list the patents a researcher has than to
list the specialized journals she has published in. Patents have
entered into tenure disputes, with the number of patents a professor
received (and even the applications he had pending) cited as evidence
that he should have been tenured."'
115. U.S. Patent No. 6,687,593 (issued February 3, 2004).
116. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (Princeton Univ. Press 2004).
117. Logan Ward et al., Breakthrough Awards, POPULAR MECHANICS, Nov. 2008, at
69, 73.
118. Elizabeth Cooney, Dueling Ernails In MIT Stem Cell Scientist's Tenure Case,
BOSTON.COM, (January 29, 2007), http://www.boston.com/yourilife/health/blog/2007/01/
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A strange tale found a scientific peer reviewer giving deference
to patent examiners. A researcher submitted a paper to the Physical
Review Letters, a leading peer-reviewed journal. The paper, Optical
Conformal Mapping, described a technique to guide electromagnetic
waves around an object, thereby disguising the object. One of the
reviewers recommended against publication, partly on the grounds
that another team had reportedly "filed a patent" on similar work."'
Peer reviewers should be leading experts in an area of science. For a
peer reviewer to rely on a patent examiner's rumored opinion in
assessing the importance of a paper is exactly backwards.
XIV. My Idea
"Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work."12 A discovery is not
patentable until it is embodied in a specific, useful invention.121 This
echoes the rule that copyright does not protect ideas, only creative
expression.12 The policy is to prevent overly broad patents.123
But a patent granted for an abstract idea would not block further
innovation if the patentee had no exclusive rights. Suppose we
created a new category of patent. Someone that invented a
mathematical method or discovered a phenomenon of nature could
seek an idea patent. Idea patents would also be available for ideas
that had not yet been applied to particular inventions. As with utility
patents, an examiner would allow an idea patent to issue only if the
idea was deemed new and non-obvious.
Such a patent would have no teeth. Anyone could freely use the
idea disclosed in the patent. But the incentive created by the
prospect of exclusive patent rights is only one reason that people seek
mit-provost-pro.html (professor citing his "12 patent applications and technology
disclosures").
119. Charles Petit, Invisibility Uncloaked, SCIENCE NEWS, Nov. 21, 2009, at 18. In any
event, the paper was eventually published in one of the leading journals, Science.
120. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
121. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2010).
123. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68 ("Here the 'process' claim is so abstract and
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary
conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of
drivers' licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through
any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.").
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patents. Indeed, most patents have no monetary value. The patent
office has become a leading authority on priority in many spheres.
Patents fulfill a similar function to prizes, diplomas, and academic
journal publication-and lend credibility to businesses claiming to
have scientific and technological expertise. The imprimatur of the
USPTO has become a weighty cultural credential.
One could save the expense of examination by simply having a
registry of ideas. But it is the idea of examination (if sometimes
overvalued) that lends the patent its weight of authority. Substantive
standards and examination would also increase the disclosure role of
the registry. To get an idea patent, the applicant would have to
provide similar disclosure as utility patents. With words and
drawings, her specification would have to enable others to understand
her idea and possible applications. Her claims would have to
distinguish the idea from prior public knowledge. For efficiency, the
same examiners for utility patents could be used for idea patents, to
take advantage of their expertise in specialized areas. In fact, if a
utility application was held unpatentable because it fell outside
patentable subject matter or was not yet applied to a specific utility,
the applicant could have the option to convert to an idea patent
application. The number of examiners would have to be increased,
but that could be paid for by fees charged for examination.
If Congress enacted this unlikely change in the patent office,
someone would quickly apply-not just to have a patent on his or her
idea, but also to be the first holder of an idea patent. They would
likely be followed by other applicants, willing to pay for a patent
without rights to exclude, but with bragging rights. Over time,
whether the system attracted more applicants would depend on its
reputation for identifying new and nonobvious ideas. The number of
applicants-and quality of the applications-in light of the fees
charged, might provide some interesting data on the patent
system-and the attribution rights it distributes.
XV. Frank Zappa and the Mothers of Invention
Copyright infringement requires copying. Patent law is
different. Suppose Inventor patents her solar-powered night-vision
goggles. Anyone that makes, uses, or sells goggles that fit within her
124. See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521 (2005).
125. See, e.g., Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding no infringement
where there was no showing that singer Mary Blige, author of song, "Family Affair" had
access to song, "Party Ain't Crunk").
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patent claims infringes the patent. It would be no defense that the
defendant independently developed the same technology, with no
knowledge of Inventor's goggles. Infringement by noncopiers is quite
common.126  One reason lies in the nature of technological
development. Necessity is indeed the mother of invention. Market
conditions and technology constraints often cause many parties to
work independently on the same technological problem. More than
one inventor may come up with a similar invention to solve the
problem. Where more than one inventor converges on an invention,
under current law, the first inventor takes the rights.1' A number of
commentators, looking to the incentive role of patents, have argued
that an independent creation defense would make economic sense.
Even without the right to recover from those that did not learn from
the inventor's technology, there would be ample incentive to
innovate.
Looking to the disclosure role of patents suggests more reasons
for an independent creation defense. Patent law offers a set of
exclusive rights in exchange for disclosing the invention and how to
make and use it. But that disclosure need go only so far as the patent
office. Many patent owners publicize their rights. Other inventors
have found reason to limit further disclosure. The most abusive
practice involved submarine patenting, where an applicant would file
an application, but use procedural devices like continuations and
divisions to delay issuance of the patent. As technology developed in
the area, the applicant would amend the claims to cover products on
126. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87
NORTH CAROLINA L. REV. 1421 (2009).
127. On disputes over inventorship as competing narratives, see Jessica M. Silbey, The
Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 319 (2008).
128. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention
Defense in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002) (arguing that independent
creation defense would preserve incentives to invent, but also permit more efficient use of
inventions), available at http://www.dklevine.com/archive/scotchmer-independent-
invention.pdf; see also Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent
Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006) (arguing that independent creation defense
would more optimally adjust economic effects of patent rights); see also John S. Leibovitz,
Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251 (2002) (suggesting that it
would be economically efficient for independent inventors to receive independent patents
on the same invention).
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the market.129 The application of "prosecution laches" has proved a
remedy against such truly unreasonable delay.""
For some inventors, patent law still gives little incentive to warn
potential infringers. While an application is pending-which can be
years1'-the applicant has no enforcement rights and may be better
off allowing others to develop potentially infringing technology. The
application may be kept confidential for at least eighteen months.
After the patent issues, the patentee may have little incentive to
disseminate the information, because that might simply be to warn
potential infringers. The patent statute does limit damages if the
patentee sells products without patent marking.3 2  But that small
requirement gives little notice to makers of other products, especially
if they are not competing in the same market. Many patents require
no marking-because the patentee does not market a product, or the
invention covers only a process that cannot be marked on a product.33
The burden is left on potential infringers to search for patents-an
impossible task in some areas, like software, with thousands of
vaguely drafted patents.
If an inventor could not recover from those who develop the
invention without knowing about Inventor's work, Inventor would
have an incentive to disseminate the technology. Beyond simply
filing for a patent, the inventor would have reason to make sure that
knowledge of the invention reached those who might otherwise come
up with it themselves. Patents disclose much technology, but
searching for relevant patents can be difficult. This would give
inventors incentive to push the information in the other direction,
publicizing patents to those who value the information. An
129. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., LP, 429
F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
130. Id. (applying prosecution laches against inventor that delayed over 18 years to
keep amending application for patent that would eventually read on bar code technology).
131. Delay can be attributed to the USPTO or to the applicant, who has considerable
ability to delay the application, if little ability to speed it up. Various other regimes may
cause delay in the patenting process. The statute provides for extra time where there is
delay from the regulatory process for pharmaceuticals. See 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2010). The
Invention Secrecy Act also provides for a delay or suppression (with compensation for the
inventor) of patent applications for inventions, where disclosure is deemed "detrimental to
the national security." 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2010) et. seq.; see also Honeywell International
Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (1985 patent application for night
vision goggles used by military delayed until 2002).
132. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2010).
133. See Stephen Lindholm, Marking the Software Patent Beast, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 82 (2005).
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instructive comparison is with the pharmaceutical industry, where
there is far less uncertainty than other industries. Patent owners must
list their patents in the Orange Book, ensuring that potential generic
competitors are aware of them'34 (as opposed to some patentees in
some industries, who could wait in the weeds until their patents cover
valuable products).
An independent creation defense could also ameliorate some of
the systemic problems with patents. Two pervasive problems are the
difficulty of locating prior art (in order to see if a patent truly covers a
new invention) and the hazards of claim construction (determining
whether the words of a patent claim should cover a particular product
or process). If independent developers were not liable for
infringement, those issues would arise in fewer cases.
Having said that, an independent creation defense could create
one problematic incentive. In order to shield researchers from
knowledge of patented technology in the field, companies might
encourage them to avoid generally following technological
developments.m"5 That happens already in some copyright industries,
such as where movie studios often have a policy of not reading
unsolicited scripts, because they cannot be liable for independently
creating a similar movie.16 So an independent creation defense could
encourage patentees to better disseminate information about their
patented technology, but encourage others in the field to shield
themselves from exactly that information.
XVI. Air Rights
Wilbur and Orville Wright invented the flying machine. The
"1903 Wright Flyer, the world's first successful airplane," occupies
pride of place in the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, in the
134. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 32-33 (The University of Chicago Press 2009).
135. To some extent, this practice is already followed by some, to avoid claims of
willful patent infringement and to avoid acquiring duties to disclose when applying for
patents.
136. See Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection For Products Of The Mind: An
'Idea' Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 779 n.12 (2006) (quoting a typical
policy: "Do not send in ideas or scripts to FOX or to [its] shows unless it is through an
accredited agent. ALL unsolicited ideas and scripts are left unopened and are THROWN
AWAY. This is for YOUR protection.").
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exhibit, "The Wright Brothers & The Invention of the Aerial Age."13 1
The "historic craft that ushered in the age of flight," appears, along
with many other Wright brothers items. The Wright brothers'
patents, and litigation to preserve their priority, often appear in
discussions of American patent law and technological development.
The Wright brothers' patents are used as exemplars of "pioneer"
patents, which open up a new area of technology." The American
story of aircraft development runs from the Wright brothers to
Boeing and the Space Shuttle.13
The German Museum in Munich tells a different story. Otto
Lilienthal invented the flying machine. The museum's prized
exhibition hall for aerospace and astronautics, features "50 original
aircraft exhibits ranging from Lilienthal to Airbus." A different view
of what constitutes an aircraft (a heavier than air glider or a powered
craft) can support a different story of where it was first developed.
A genial local geographical attribution competition involves the
Wright brothers themselves. The brothers worked on their planes in
Dayton, Ohio, and flew them in Kittyhawk, North Carolina. The
license plates of Ohio read "Birthplace of Aviation," while North
Carolina's proclaim, "First In Flight."14") Some attribute cultural
influences to productivity in innovation:
Like the fella says, in Italy for 30 years under the Borgias they
had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed, but they produced
Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In
Switzerland they had brotherly love - they had 500 years of
democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo
clock.141
137. The Wright Brothers & The Invention of the Aerial Age, SMITHSONIAN
NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM, http://nasm.si.edu/wrightbrothers/ (last visited Oct.
14,2010).
138. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
439 (2004).
139. The Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum begins with "the original 1903
Wright Flyer" and ends with "the sole-surviving Boeing 307 Stratoliner and space shuttle
Enterprise." National Air and Space Museum Press Kit, http://www.nasm.si.edu/events/
pressroom/presskits/museumkit/overview_ nasm.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
140. Ohio changed its slogan slightly to "Birthplace of Aviation Pioneers," to include
the many astronauts from Ohio, including John Glenn and Neil Armstrong. Stephen
Colbert observed: "Twenty-two astronauts were born in Ohio. What is it about your state
that makes people want to flee the earth?"
141. Graham Green, THE THIRD MAN (London Film Productions 1949) (character
Harry Lime speaking).
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When the Supreme Court listed patented inventions that "push
back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like," it listed patents
that were all Made in America-and patented in the USPTO. 142 The
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America may have
wondered if such national feelings crept into patent jurisprudence. In
1905, the United States Patent Office issued patents on radio
technology to Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi. In 1909, Marconi
won the Nobel Prize in Physics in recognition of his "contributions to
the development of wireless telegraphy." In 1943, after decades of
dispute, the Supreme Court of the United States held the patents
invalid, as obvious in light of work by others.14  Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting, questioned the ability of his fellow justices to assess such
"vast transforming forces of technology" from several decades
removed. 144 It may not have helped the Marconi cause that Italy was
by then at war with the United States.
There was considerable conflict between the French and
American governments over proper attribution for the discovery that
HIV caused AIDS. French and American research groups had
cooperated and shared material, and there was suspicion that the
Americans had somehow misappropriated the virus. The
governments eventually reached a compromise, under which the
leaders of the French and American teams were named as joint
inventors on the patent on the test for AIDS. In the years since, it
has become generally accepted that there was no misconduct and that
both teams contributed. The French isolated the virus and the
Americans proved its role in causing AIDS. In 2008, however, the
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine went to two scientists from the
French team, in recognition of their work on the discovery of HIV,
along with a cancer researcher. The resolution of the patent dispute
evidently did not carry over to attribution for the scientific
achievement.
Other cultural tales depend on differing viewpoints of
discovery. In a 2010 book on breakthroughs in technology,
comparing pioneering in physics to pioneering in America, a Nobel
laureate physicist wrote that Columbus's "discovery of the New
142. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316, n.10 (1980) (listing "telegraph
(Morse, No. 1,647); telephone (Bell, No. 174,465); electric lamp (Edison, No. 223,898);
airplane (the Wrights, No. 821,393); transistor (Bardeen & Brattain, No. 2,524,035);
neutronic reactor (Fermi & Szilard, No. 2,708,656); laser (Schawlow & Townes, No.
2,929,922).").
143. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 4 (1943).
144. Id. at 63 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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World roughly doubled the land area available to humans."14 5 Stories
become so ingrained that we forget about the humans left out of the
story.146
XVII. Cultural Property
During the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference,
indigenous activists held a march to the United States embassy in
Copenhagen. The group intended to "send a message to the US
government that no longer can their energy policy and their
unsustainable development practices threaten the future of
indigenous peoples." 4 7 They also made an appeal, with legalistic
overtones, that the "United States respect the rights of indigenous
peoples and that they endorse the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples." 148 The Declaration, among other things,
provides that "Indigenous Peoples have the right to own and control
their intellectual and cultural property including indigenous sciences,
technologies, genetic, seeds, medicines, flora and fauna, languages,
literature, designs and visual and performing arts."l49 Intellectual
property here does not serve the common role of providing economic
incentives. Rather, cultural property can provide key elements to
support other rights, such as the rights to education, to practice
cultural traditions and to self-determination.""
The United States has been one of a minority of nations that
have opposed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. One reason is that the declaration takes a
somewhat different approach to certain intellectual property issues
145. Frank Wilczek, Homesteading In Hilbert Space, THIS WILL CHANGE
EVERYTHING: IDEAS THAT WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE 60, 60 (John Brockman ed. 2010).
146. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN
LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (Oxford U. Press 1990).
147. Amy Goodman, Indigenous Activists March on US Embassy in Copenhagen
Urging Obama to 'Stop the US Energy Industry's War on Native Peoples and Lands,'
DEMOCRACY Now (December 10, 2009), http://www.democracynow.org/2009/12/10/
indigenous activists march on us embassy. The group included Faith Gemmill of Arctic
Village in Alaska and Clayton Thomas-Muller of the Canadian group, Indigenous Tar
Sands Campaign.
148. Id.
149. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295, art. 29 (Sept. 13, 2007).
150. See Lorie Graham, A Right to Media?, 41.2 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 101
(forthcoming 2010); Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty
Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 191 (2001).
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than does the United States. Its approach is seen to conflict with the
individualistic nature of intellectual property law. The United States
Constitution contemplates granting rights to authors and inventors.
Group rights, by contrast, have been deemed alien to the basic
framework of such laws. If groups were granted rights in folklore or
traditional knowledge or other cultural elements, the argument runs,
there could be intractable problems, such as determining the
appropriate group, arbitrating differences in opinion about exercising
the rights, and providing a means for other to deal with the group to
seek permission to use the cultural elements.'"' Intellectual property
rights, although granted to individuals, are often held by groups. The
shareholders of IBM are the ultimate owners of many thousands of
patents and copyrights. The corporate structure allows IBM to
manage those rights interest effectively. Indigenous group could
likewise use their existing governing structures to handle rights.
Effective means to protect the ability of indigenous people to
protect traditional knowledge might require no more than leveling
the playing field.152 Under United States law, an invention published
anywhere in the world is no longer patentable by others.' By
contrast, an invention that has been used in the United States is not
patentable by others.'14 So where traditional knowledge (such as
medicines) has been passed by oral tradition outside the United
States, it remains patentable by others in the United States.'
Similarly, confidential information (such as some traditional
knowledge, folklore, or religious rites) receives far less protection
than commercial confidential information, which gets coverage in
many spheres, from trade secret law to the Computer Fraud and
151. See Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175
(2000). See generally Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy
in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern
Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and
Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 769, 819-22 (1999);
MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (Harvard Universty Press 2003).
152. See Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual
Property, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 313, 328-32 (2005).
153. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
154. Id.
155. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 281 (2001)
("There is no doubt that the appropriation of traditional knowledge continues and the
existing U.S. patent system permits and encourages such appropriation to the extent that it
fails to recognize foreign prior art unless it is published.").
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Abuse Act.' Copyright likewise draws some uneven distinctions. If
a filmmaker recorded the performance of a sacred dance or a folk
talk, the filmmaker would have copyright in the work for her life
effectively forever, while the indigenous group would have no say
about dissemination of the work, because their contribution would be
deemed not original.' Evening out some of those disparities would
support the rights of self-determination for indigenous people-and
in a broader sense, support the justifications to have intellectual
property.
Protecting traditional knowledge and other information of
indigenous people might be seen as diminishing the public domain.
The public domain can be misleading, if the effect is to open the
cultural heritage of one group for the use other groups."* Moreover,
respect for cultural identity and self-determination need not entail the
strong property rights often associated with intellectual property.
Often, it would be sufficient to provide a means for indigenous people
to be consulted before others made use of their information or
symbols, to participate in the commercialization of their traditional
knowledge, and to prevent deceptive uses of cultural property.
XVIII. Unreasonable Delay
In 1794, President Washington signed the Treaty of
Canandaigua"" with the Oneida Indian Nation, recognizing its rights
to some three hundred thousand acres of aboriginal land,"' and
promising that "[t]he United States acknowledges the lands reserved
to the Oneida ... and the United States will never claim the same,
156. See Graham & McJohn, supra note 152.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
158. Cf Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004).
159. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of
Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1103 (2009) ("affording indigenous groups even minimum
protections and profit-sharing rights in harvesting, collecting, organizing, disseminating,
and selling their traditional knowledge is crucial, and it can be achieved without employing
the absolute ownership rights or exclusive access that cultural property critics fear.").
160. Indian Treaty Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44. The Rehnquist Court
overturned a number of long-standing principles of tribal sovereignty in Oneida and other
cases. See Lorie Graham, The Racial Discourse of Federal Indian Law, 42 TULSA L. REV.
103 (2007).
161. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 231 (1985); see also
Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1991)
(situating the case within the Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence).
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nor disturb them." 16 2  By 1920, the Oneida Indian Nation was
dispossessed, in favor of "pioneers," of all but thirty-two acres of its
homeland."' This was achieved through illegal treaties imposed by
New York State, purported "sales" of tribal land by individuals
without authority, and leases that were unilaterally treated as sales,
all in violation of the treaty and federal law.164 Many Oneida
acquiesced to pressure to move West under New York State's
allotment policy and the United States' removal policy. There was
then no legal avenue to reclaim their land.
After legal and political changes (including a federal policy of
self-determination for Indian people and changes in federal-question
jurisdiction)," the Supreme Court made clear in 1974 for the first
time that the Oneida Indian Nation had a right to maintain a claim of
possession in federal court." In 1985, the Court affirmed the Tribe's
claim of illegal dispossession and sent the case back to the district
court to determine damages.167 The case remains in negotiation.
Meanwhile, the Oneidas, on the open market, bought back
some of the lands reserved to them under the Treaty of
Canandaigua. 16  When the City of Sherrill attempted to evict the
Oneidas from their reserved lands for failure to pay taxes, the Nation
sought relief in federal court. 69  The district court and the Second
Circuit found in favor of the Oneida Indian Nation on the grounds
that the lands at issue were within the historic boundaries of the
Tribe's reservation and therefore not taxable by the City of Sherrill.170
The case went to the Supreme Court, where the U.S. Solicitor
General submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the Oneidas'
right "to assert sovereign dominion over the parcels" at issue.' ' The
Supreme Court reversed. 172 The Court did not deny the Oneida's
162. Oneida, 470 U.S. at 231 n.1 (quoting Treaty of Canandaigua, 7 Stat. at 45).
163. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 207 (2005).
164. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8(3); 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2010) (prohibiting conveyance
of Indian land absent a treaty agreeing to that conveyance); Trade and Intercourse Act of
1793, 1 Stat. 329 (1845); see also Oneida, 470 U.S. at 240.
165. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (granting district courts original jurisdiction over civil
actions brought by Indian tribes).
166. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1974).
167. Oneida, 470 U.S. at 233, 253-54.
168. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202.
169. See id. at 211-12.
170. Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 377 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 2003).
171. Id. at 213.
172. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214.
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claim on the merits. Rather, it held that Oneida was barred under the
doctrine of laches, holding that principles of "equity . . . preclude the
Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew
cold."'73
The parties had not raised or briefed the issue of laches. The
Court apparently assumed that there was no need to give the Oneida
an opportunity to address whether they had made an unreasonable
delay that had caused prejudice to New York State, the two
requirements of laches. The Court supplied facts, stating that "it was
not until lately that the Oneidas sought to regain ancient sovereignty
over land converted from wilderness to become part of cities like
Sherrill." 174 Given an opportunity to make a record, the Oneida might
have given evidence of their long struggle to retain their land, and the
dire economic and political conditions they faced. Nor did the Court
consider the fact that there was no legal basis for the Oneida to
proceed until 1974, when the Supreme Court finally held that federal
courts had jurisdiction to hear these claims. Prior to that time, all
sorts of legal and political barriers existed to the assertion of land
claims.
On the second requirement of laches, a record may have shown
prejudice not to New York State or local governments-who
benefited from the illegal taking of Indian lands-but the Oneidas,
who lost most of their historical homelands. The only prejudice the
Court even indirectly discussed was harm that it conjectured for the
future "disruptive practical consequences" that would be suffered by
the City of Sherrill, the County of Oneida, and the non-Indian
landowners.' Had a record been made, any possibility of
administrative "disruption" might have been outweighed by the
benefits from Oneida's economic activity, as the largest local
employer. 17 The Court also theorized:
If [Oneida] may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and
remove these parcels from the local tax rolls, little would
prevent the Tribe from initiating a new generation of litigation
to free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory
controls that protect all landowners in the area.177
173. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 215.
175. Id. at 219.
176. See Oneida Indian Nation Annual Report (2005) (on file with authors).
177. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220.
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The only showing of prejudice was speculation by the Court itself
that the Oneida would claim jurisdiction over non-Indians'
"neighboring the tribal patches" and claim exemption from zoning or
regulatory laws that "protect all landowners.""'
Meanwhile, another suit was making its way through the United
States Patent and Trademark Office and the federal courts. In 1992, a
petition was filed with the USPTO by a member of the Oneida, along
with members of the Cheyenne, Hodulgee Muscogee, Ysleta del Sur
Pueblo, Din6, Standing Rock Sioux, Oglala Lakota, and Cochiti
Pueblo. The petition sought cancellation of the trademark "The
Washington Redskins," on the grounds that the mark disparaged
Native Americans. After a lengthy adversary proceeding, the
USPTO granted the petition. The federal courts, in a series of
decisions lasting until 2009, reversed the ruling. The courts did not
rule that the mark was not disparaging. They held that the petitioners
were barred by laches.
The issue of laches had seemed promising for the petitioners.
The trademark statute provides that petitions for cancellation must
be brought within five years for only certain claims, such as claims
brought on the grounds that a mark is merely descriptive. The statute
provides that a petition may be brought "at any time" on other
grounds, such as claims that a mark is deceptive, immoral, or
disparaging to a group of people. The Third Circuit, in an opinion by
future Supreme Court Justice Alito, had held that because of this
distinction, laches would not bar a claim which the statute provided
could be brought "at any time."'9 The D.C. Circuit, however,
rejected the Third Circuit's conclusion. Otherwise, the court
reasoned, "this would make section 1069, which explicitly permits
consideration of laches and other equitable doctrines, meaningless as
to cancellation petitions.,1 so But section 1069 is not so broad, simply
stating that "equitable principles of laches, estoppel, and
acquiescence, where applicable may be considered and applied."""' If
the statute provides that a petition can be brought "at any time," that
would make laches inapplicable. Moreover, other equitable
principles would remain, so section 1069 would retain ample force.
Finally, a distinction between petitions that must be brought within
178. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220.
179. Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 193-94 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2001).
180. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44,48 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (2010).
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five years and those that can be brought at any time is in accord with
the statutory scheme for incontestability. When a mark has been
registered for five years, its validity cannot be challenged on certain
grounds (the same as those in which a cancellation may be brought
within five years), but can still be challenged on other grounds (the
same as the "at any time" cancellation grounds)."12
Applying laches, the courts held that there was prejudice from
the seven year, nine month delay between registration of the mark
and the filing of the petition.8 The court looked to the death of
former Redskins president Edward Bennett Williams during the
delay period, and the continued investment in the mark during that
time.114 Williams had met with Native American leaders close to the
time of registration to discuss their views."' So the court held that by
negotiating rather than filing, the petitioners induced the mark
owners to not preserve relevant evidence and assume that no
cancellation proceeding would be filed. In other words, Edward
Bennett Williams, founder of one the most influential American law
firms and lawyer to such figures as Frank Sinatra and Michael Milken,
would not take steps to protect legal rights to the name of his
business.
The case ended. The dispute will continue. As the court held,
laches applies only to delay after a potential petitioner reaches the
age of majority. So another cancellation petition has been brought
before the USPTO, filed by petitioners who were minors during the
period of delay as soon as they reached majority. Eventually the
courts will have to decide on the merits whether the mark "Redskins"
is disparaging to Native Americans. The result of applying laches was
more delay.
XIX. Words
A human is an animal. So held the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.6
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2010).
183. Harjo, 415 F.3d at 50; see also Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 565 F. 3d 880, 884
(2009) (quoting Gull Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, 694 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C.
Cir.1982) ("If only a short period of time elapses between accrual of the claim and suit, the
magnitude of prejudice required before suit would be barred is great, if the delay is
lengthy, a lesser showing of prejudice is required.")).
184. Id., 565 F. 3d at 883.
185. Id.
186. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Martek Bioscience held a patent on "methods for increasing the
concentration of omega-3 HUFA in animals by feeding them
microorganisms of the order Thraustochytriales." 8 7 Martek had
patented a process of increasing the healthy omega-3 fats in animals
by feeding them enriched algae. Nutrinova used similar method on
nutritional supplements for people. When sued for infringement,
Nutrinova argued that its supplements fell outside the patent claim
because Martek's patents covered animals, and humans were not
animals.
The court relied primarily on the first line of the definition in the
patent: "The term 'animal' means any organism belonging to the
kingdom Animalia.".. Giving deference to that language, the court
gave little weight to the many references to "animal" in the patent
that did not seem to contemplate humans. It was unmoved by the
rest of the definition: "Preferred animals from which to produce a
food product include any economic food animal. More preferred
animals include animals from which eggs, milk products, poultry
meat, seafood, beef, pork or lamb is derived.""' Elsewhere the patent
differentiated between "foods for human intake and for animal
feed.""" Because the patent itself defined "human," the court also
declined to look to general culture or scientific literature to see
whether "animal" includes "human."9'
Claim construction questions like that are the bread and butter
of the Federal Circuit's patent cases. The questions often sound
philosophical. The court has held that "and" may mean the same as
"or."' 92 "A" can mean "one or more.""' A case can turn on the
meaning of the words "only if" in a patent claim.194 The court often
addresses such queries as whether a distance specifies a "location,"
how close something must be to be "local,"196 how far to be
187. Martek Biosciences Corp., 579 F.3d at 1367.
188. Id. at 1380.
189. Id. at 1381.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1382.
192. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. Indus., Ltd., 344 Fed. App'x. 595, 598-
97 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
193. Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
194. 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
195. Vehicle IP, LLC v. GMC, 306 Fed. Appx. 574 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
196. Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 525 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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"remote,"" the meaning of "mechanism,"' whether 1/8 is "about"
1/5," even what the meaning of "means" is.2() In a typical case, the
court held that "flexible" means something more than crushable.2 01
Patent law questions turn on what patents cover, and that almost
always requires interpreting the words of the patent claims.
A technical background is required to practice before the patent
office, or to work as an examiner in the patent office. But perhaps
some literary, linguistic, or philosophical training should be required.
Patents cover technology, but patent rights ultimately depend only on
the meaning of the words in the patent claims. In patent law jargon,
patent claims "read" on products or processes. Each patent
application reflects a story, usually reflected in the section named
"Background of the Invention." The invention must fit into a legal
storyline-a conception of the invention, a reduction to practice, and
a filing of the application. Fitting their dramatic importance, those
times are known as "critical dates." The claims in the patent
application depend on words, although they may be supplemented
with drawings, models, and even samples of biological materials. The
meaning of those claims may be broad or narrow. A patent applicant
is not necessarily in favor of a broad or narrow claim meaning. A
broad claim in a patent makes the patent more powerful, because it
covers more potential infringers. But a broad claim in the application
also makes the patent more difficult to obtain (and also easier to
invalidate in litigation). A broad claim, exactly because it covers
more products or processes, is more likely to be invalid because it is
not novel (it covers existing technology) or is not enabled (goes
beyond the description of the invention disclosed in the application).
The linguistic stakes have other battlegrounds. A patent claim must
be distinct. It is invalid if held "indefinite."
All law involves words, but every patent depends on the meaning
of the words in its particular claims. Because each applicant may
draft her own claims, and even define the meanings of the words,
interpretation is needed in every single case. In most areas,
197. Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 527 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
198. Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
199. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
200. See, e.g., Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (interpreting whether use of "means" in claim triggered means-plus-function rule).
201. In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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documents and terminology are much more standardized. Patent law,
albeit centered on technology, might be the most interpretation-
intensive area of law. High tech law has not moved far from the
eighteenth century, where there was no fine distinction between
lawyers and writers. Samuel Johnson, the author of the best-known
early dictionary and the leading eighteenth century literary figure,
was also a legal thinker.2 02
XX. Emulation
Do away with software patents, say many.2 3 Software
development, in contrast to an area like pharmaceuticals, requires
relatively little investment in resources. Software patents are too
broad, because an algorithm developed in one area will very likely
have application in many other industries.2 05 Software patents are said
to be too vague and abstract to interpret fairly.
Putting those reasons together, it becomes impossible for people
to receive the notice that they should have of possible infringement.
Someone using a chemical or mechanical device can search the
relevant patents to know if she is likely infringing. But anyone
developing software may be potentially infringing thousands of
patents that were developed in many different areas. Finally, and
most important, software patents do not offer the same incentive for
innovation as in other areas. Software patents can indeed sometimes
be valuable for their owners. But that incentive is likely outweighed,
for innovators, by bearing the cost (including both risk of
infringement and the cost of uncertainty itself) that their innovation
would infringe. In short, even most information technology
companies might agree to do away with software patents.
Given the inability of Congress to accomplish even minor patent
reform, legislation with such broad effects (and with many likely
opponents) will not come anytime soon. But suppose that Congress
were inclined to eliminate software patents (or the Supreme Court
decided to interpret the patent statute to bar them-or even the
202. See John Scanlan, Samuel Johnson's Legal Thought, SAMUEL JOHNSON AFTER
300 YEARS 112 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
203. See, e.g., BEN KLEMENS, MATH YOU CAN'T USE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND
SOFTWARE (Brookings Inst. Press 2006).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE
COU RTS CAN SOLVE IT 4 (The University of Chicago Press 2009).
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Constitution, on the theory that software is not an invention). It
might not be feasible to eliminate software patents.
Suppose Congress passes an uncommonly concise statute: "No
more software patents." Inventor concocts a snazzy piece of software
for controlling a rubber-curing manufacturing process. She cannot
patent the software, it seems. So she simply hardcodes the rubber-
curing controlling process in a special purpose chip. Software is
simply 1's and O's, at the end of the day, and anything that can be
expressed in that binary form can also be expressed as gates on a chip
(representing those 1's and O's). Put another way, a software program
can always be emulated in hardware, and vice versa (if we make the
sometimes unrealistic assumption of unlimited time, memory, and
components). Whether to implement something in hardware or
software is often simply an engineering choice influenced by cost,
constraints, compatibility with other devices, and user preferences.
So Inventor patents her rubber-manufacturing-control device. If
Copycat then copies the chip and implements it in a software program
(bringing things full circle), is that infringement? If so, then Inventor
has a software patent. If not, then many electronics patents would
have little bite to them because the invention could be copied and
emulated in software. With electronics increasingly appearing in
most technology, this would put a considerable damper on patent
protection generally.
So an outright bar on software patents is likely unworkable (not
to mention politically impossible, and likely unwise). We will
continue to deal with the problems of software patents piecemeal,
with the tools of existing patent law. All of this emphasizes the
problems with software patents. Because software is so mutable and
adaptable, it provides great tools for technological development. But
that also means that trying to capture a "software" invention in the
words of a patent claim-like trying to interpret the words of a patent
claim to see if they encompass another's technology-will remain a
refractory problem.
XXI. Patents as Literature
There is no more Sisyphean task in law than patent claim
construction. Courts commonly try to interpret words in documents.
But in most areas, there is some standardization, or at least
precedent. Contracts use forms. Real estate documents use terms of
art. Where a statute has an unclear meaning-such as the meaning
of "accessing" a computer without "authority" under the Computer
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Fraud and Abuse Act-there are likely to be many cases interpreting
the words at issue.
Patent claims are different. Every patent claim is new, because
you cannot patent something that has already been patented. In
looking to the meaning of the words in the claims, the court looks first
to that particular patent: whether the word is defined in the patent,
how it is used in the written description, how that particular inventor
used that particular word.2  Only if the patent does not provide
sufficient guidance is the court to look to extrinsic evidence, such as
dictionaries.2 08 When the court has interpreted the meaning of a word
in a patent claim, that interpretation applies for only that patent.
When construing the next patent, the court starts anew, just like
Sisyphus, even if the same word is used in the next patent (and due to
the diversity of patents and patent litigation, usually the words at
issue are quite different). Indeed, one source that courts look to
surprisingly infrequently is previous patent cases. Courts cite to the
various vague and conflicting maxims of interpretation, but rarely cite
how courts have actually interpreted similar words in the area.2 9
This raises an interesting question for patent theory and practice.
Courts may not look back at earlier patents very often. But the
people drafting the patents do. Lawyers never like to start a
document from scratch. A wise lawyer drafting any document (a
sales contract, a will, a promissory note, a patent application) will
seek an example to work from. Patent practitioners likewise use
other's work-and learn from practitioners in their field. A
potentially fruitful research project would be to study patents with a
literary approach.
Software patents provide a good example. It is a commonplace
that software patents are often abstract and vague.2( Courts in patent
cases have become accustomed to giving substance to abstract terms.
207. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
208. Id.
209. There are some words used routinely in patent claims, such as the transition
phrases, like "consisting of," and "comprising." Courts do look to earlier decisions
interpreting these standard phrases-although some decisions manage to apply them
differently to individual patents.
210. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 199, 256 (Princeton
Univ. Press 2008) (discussing how claims in software patents, which often have abstract
patent claims that are unclear about what technology they cover, may be read to cover
technologies that are unknown at the time the patent is filed, and use broad wording
whose meaning might change over time, especially in the fast-moving fields of
technology).
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A patent on a computer-implemented invention might not even
mention that basic aspect: "although the specification did not use the
'magic word 'computer," a general or special purpose computer was
clearly the structure intended." 211
Software patent claims, however, need not be vague and abstract.
A software invention, if implemented, is necessarily sharply defined
by the process of writing it into code. So the patent application could
piggyback on the code, using the code to clearly define the invention.
Applicants do not do this, for several reasons. The courts have not
required disclosure of code to meet the requirement that the
application "enable" others to make and use the invention.212
Narrow, specific claims tied to the particular implementation would
yield similarly narrow, specific protection -whereas applicants prefer
broad protection.
There are many ways applicants could move from the narrow
code of the invention to the broad language of patent claims. Early in
software patent practice, creative lawyer wordsmiths must have
developed terminology (or borrowed it from software phraseology or
other areas of patent practice, which would be quite illuminating) to
describe the functions of software in sufficiently broad terms. It
seems likely that careful reading of early software patents could
identify usages that have developed in software patent prosecution,
which would throw considerable light on the meaning of those vague
and abstract terms.21 Scholars in literature and linguistics track down
words through historical documents to their source. Law could
benefit from those methods-and from investing in the resources to
apply them.
211. Aristocrat Technologies. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 266 Fed.
Appx. 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
212. See, e.g., Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
213. Patent lawyers used drafting techniques to deal with case law on whether software
was patentable. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in
the Software Industry, 89 CAL L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (describing use of "magic words," to
patent software, before Supreme Court recognized software as patentable, by claiming
software inventions as "hardware devices, pizza ovens, and other 'machines."').
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XXII. Ships that Pass in the Night
Not long ago, there were two patent law conferences in Boston.
One looked at the state of software patent law.214 Viewpoints ranged
from IBM, holder of thousands of software patents, to the Software
Freedom Law Center, which advocates that software is not
patentable.215 Panels explored the dynamics of software patents in
areas from financial services to ecommerce to scientific instruments.
There was great variation on policy recommendations on every topic
but one. All speakers agreed that there should be more disclosure in
software patents.216
The second conference was geared to patent practitioners.2'
Speakers ranged from patent prosecutors (who draft applications and
represent inventors before the USPTO), to investors, to patent
litigators. In many different forms, they provided advice that has
become widespread among patent lawyers:218 there should be less
disclosure in software patents. Do not define terms used in claims.
Do not identify the category of invention in claim preambles, nor
identify "important" features of the invention-nor even use the
word "invention" in the written description. Do not explain the flaws
of competing technology, nor the advantages of the claimed
invention. For software, do not submit a copy of the program code.
Do not keep up on technology in the field, nor do a prior art search
before filing a patent application. As to "Background of the
Invention": consider it an "admission against interest."2 1
214. "Software Patents: A Time for Change?," MIT and Boston University School of
Law, November 16-17, 2006, program available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/
swconf/.
215. Brief for the Software Freedom Law Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
216. See Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (arguing for
improvements on disclosure in patents); see also Dan Burk, The Role of Patent Law in
Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008) (discussing how
considerations of disclosure's role in codifying knowledge could play into analysis of
patent law doctrine).
217. Claim Drafting to Hearings: Judicial And Litigation Perspectives, Tactics for
Mastering Markman Issues, sponsored by Advanced Legal Studies Program of Suffolk
University Law School, Boston Patent Law Association and the Social Law Library
(October 20, 2006), http://www.law.suffolk.edu/academic/als/coursedetail.cfm?cid=519.
218. See Stephen McJohn, Patents: Hiding from History, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 961 (2008).
219. Jeffrey L. Snow, Partner, K&L Gates, Patent Law Presentation Claim Drafting
Issues from the Litigator's Point of View, Tactics for Mastering Markman Issues (October
20, 2006).
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Such "intentional obscurity" in claim drafting flows from
incentives created by cases that read claims narrowly to limit the
claim to specific disclosures in the application.22() In light of these
cases, an applicant is better off making vague, broad disclosures that
can support broad claims to the invention. If the written description
refers to "the invention," the claims may be interpreted to apply only
to the particular device referred to in that section of the application.221
If the "Background of the Invention" section points out drawbacks to
some technology, the patent claims may be read not to cover
implementations of the invention that use that technology. 2 If the
invention has broad use, but the application discusses specific
applications, the claims may be read to apply only to such
*223applications.
There is, however, one line of cases that could create a better
incentive. In these cases, the courts have held that patent claims were
not "enabled" where the disclosure in the application did not support
124the full range of the patent claim. In short, these cases encourage
applications to disclose as wide a range of applications as possible in
order to "enable" broad patent claims. Such cases have emphasized
that "the full scope of the claimed invention must be enabled." 225
Patent law should encourage disclosure, not punish it.
220. See Dennis Crouch, Philips v. AWH Takes A Casualty: 'Interface' Construed as
'Parallel Bus Interface,' PATENTLY-O (May 11, 2006), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2006/05/philips v awh t.html.
221. See Dennis Crouch, Use of Phrase 'This Invention' Limits Claim Scope,
PATENTLY-0 (June 25, 2006), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/06/cafc-use-of
phr.html.
222. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2006). See also AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("Where the general summary or description of the invention describes a feature of
the invention (here, micelles formed by the solubilizer) and criticizes other products (here,
other solubilizers, including co-solvents) that lack that same feature, this operates as a
clear disavowal of these other products.").
223. See, e.g., On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) ("Although we agree with the district court that the Ross invention does not
concern itself with whether the 'customer' reads the book or obtains it for resale, the focus
of the Ross patent is immediate single-copy printing and binding initiated by the customer
and conducted at the customer's site.").
224. See Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 278, 282-84 (2008).
225. Pharm. Res., Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 253 Fed. Appx. 26 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("surfactant" not enabled with just 3 working examples ); Liebel -Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (claim to method of using genetic engineering to make plant cells
resistant to herbicide was not fully enabled, where at relevant time method only worked
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XXIII. Lightning in a Bottle
No one knows how to perfect a security interest in intellectual
property, but anyone can do it.
Scrooge finances Marley Software, getting Marley's patents,
trademarks, and copyrights as collateral. Any secured creditor should
perfect its security interest so it is protected against other claimants,
like a bankruptcy trustee. If Scrooge does not perfect, he loses the
collateral if Marley goes bankrupt. Creditors normally perfect by
filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the relevant state office. For
some types of collateral, federal law preempts: security interests in
ships, aircraft, and railroad equipment require filing in federal
agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Authority. The patent,
trademark and copyright statutes all allow filing of documents
relevant to those rights. But none of the three statutes are at all clear
as to whether federal filing for security interests is required and
displaces state law.
Courts have reached a variety of conclusions: some require
federal filing, some require state filing. Some courts hold that
intellectual property should simply piggyback on the state law UCC
filing system for personal property.226 Others hold that the specialized
systems for intellectual property should take priority. One court
even held that federal filing is required for registered copyrights and
state filing for unregistered copyrights.2' Congress has shown little
interest in clarifying the boundary between state commercial law and
federal intellectual property law.
Nevertheless, plenty of money is invested with intellectual
property as collateral. Lawyers find ways to navigate around
uncertainty. Not knowing where to file, a creditor can simply file in
both the state and federal office. One of those filings perfects the
security interest, although we do not know which one. This is similar
the logic puzzle involving the island of liars and truthtellers. A
visitor, at a fork in the road, who simply asks which road leads to the
to the capital city, cannot depend on the answer, not knowing if she is
for some categories of plant cells). See also Kenneth Canfield, The Disclosure of Source
Code in Software Patents: Should Software Patents be Open Source?, 7 COLUM. SC. &
TECH. L. REV. 1 (2006).
226. Matter of Roman Cleanser, 43 B.R. 940, 942 (Bankr. Mich., 1984) (holding
security interest in trademarks perfected by state law filing); In re Cybernetic Services.
Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding security interest in patents perfected by
state law filing).
227. In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 199-200 (C.D. Cal., 1990).
228. In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).
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asking a liar or a truthteller. But she can ask, "If I ask you the
direction to the capital, which way would you tell me to go?" A
truthteller would tell her the true direction. A liar would give the
same answer, because the liar would lie about which answer that the
liar would have given.
Dire circumstances prompt creative lawyering. The creditor in
In re Coldwave Systems229 made both federal and state filings, but not
in timely fashion. The creditor nevertheless argued that it had
perfected its security interest the old-fashioned way. In lieu of filing,
a creditor may perfect by taking possession of tangible collateral.2
Like filing, possession puts other potential creditors on notice. The
creditor argued that it was perfected because it was in possession of
the patent certificate, the impressive document issued by the USPTO,
with a red ribbon. But the patent certificate does not embody the
patent rights. The creditor's collateral was the patentee's set of
intangible rights, and one cannot put intangible rights in a creditor's
vault. If only the puzzles of intellectual property could be made so
concrete.
XXIV. Disclosure
Peter Chamberlen invented forceps to aid in childbirth. That
invention saved hundreds of lives during the seventeenth century. It
could have saved many thousands. Over three generations, the
Chamberlen family kept the use of forceps as a trade secret,
concealing the instrument and even blindfolding their patients at
times.
In patent policy discussions, the disclosure aspect of patent law
receives far less attention than patent's incentive role. The main
focus of patent policy is balancing the incentives to innovators against
the costs to competition of granting exclusive rights. 2  But a
comparison to copyright shows how important the disclosure aspect
of patent law is. Incentive plays a much greater role as a justification
for copyright. An artist considering creating a book or movie is likely
to choose with copyright in mind. In a world with copyright, she can
229. In re Coldwave Sys., LLC, 368 B.R. 91, 98 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007).
230. U.C.C. § 9-313 (2005).
231. Atul Gawande, The Score: How Childbirth Went Industrial, THE NEW YORKER
(October 9, 2006).
232. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 66 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 2009) (describing widespread
agreement that disclosure function is "subordinate" in patent theory).
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create the work and rely on copyright to prevent others from free
riding. In a world without copyright, she might not spend a year
creating the book or movie. Copyright protects her incentive to
create. But copyright does not require much disclosure. It is not
necessary to publish the work to have copyright, or to register the
work. One has copyright in a secret diary. Even if she registers,
disclosure is limited. The disclosure regulations provide many
exceptions. If she deposits copies, they are simply put in the Library
of Congress, or more often, disposed of quietly after a period of time,
under the Copyright Office's retention policy. Unlike patents,
copyrighted works cannot be freely searched online.
More important, even when the author publishes the work, she
does not open the door for competitors to wait until the copyright
expires. Patents expire. Some twenty years after the inventor
applies, her patent will expire and competitors will be able to use the
required disclosure in the patent to make, use, and sell the
invention.233 Copyrights do not expire-for practical purposes. For
works created today, copyright lasts the authors life plus 70 years.234
For works created before 1977, copyright last 95 years. Works
created in the 1920s are still under copyright. Inventions from the
1920s are no longer patented (nor are inventions from the 1930s,
1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s-with a few quirky exceptions).
Disclosure also matters more for patents because secrecy is more
likely to be an option. For the author creating a book or movie, the
way to exploit the work is to go to the public. Many inventors may
have their cake and eat it. If the invention is a bottle manufacturing
process, an algorithm controlling a rubber-curing process, or
superfine tweezers used in harvesting silk, the inventor may be able to
commercialize the invention without disclosing it. The purchasers of
the bottles, the rubber, and the silk cannot discern the invention used
back at the plant. To patent the invention, however, the inventor
must disclose it. So many inventors choose between protecting the
invention as a trade secret or with a patent.236 If a Chamberlen today
invented a nanoforceps for manipulating stem cells, she might prefer
to get a patent than to try to keep the invention secret. Trade secrecy
would require that she use the invention only under conditions of
233. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2010).
234. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2010).
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2010).
236. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 34.
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secrecy and strictly limit knowledge about it.237 She would lose rights
if somehow the invention became publicly known-or if someone else
invented a similar device. A patent would allow her to publicize the
invention and commercialize it broadly, through licensing. She would
have to disclose the invention and would lose exclusive rights in
twenty years. But disclosure would also allow her get credit for the
work (the attribution people find so important). The present value of
losing rights in twenty years in the future is small. The odds of
keeping it a secret for twenty years are not great; patent protection
might be likely to last longer. Disclosure of the technology in return
for a stronger set of rights with a more certain term, along with the
chance to get credit for the invention, looks like a good deal.
In fact, for many patents, disclosure may actually be the biggest
advantage from obtaining a patent. The vast majority of patents have
no direct commercial value, viewed solely in terms of securing market
power. Some simply represent unlucky bets, where applicants filed in
the hopes that the invention will be commercially successful. But
patents have many other types of value, beyond securing a market.
Patents with more diffuse commercial value are displayed to investors
(such as showing venture capitalists that the start-up indeed has
developed something), to customers ("our patented technology"), to
competitors (as part of patent portfolios, which industry rivals use
like missile silos). For many firms, far from being secrets to protect,
technology is often more like antlers to flaunt.23 8 Inventors also seek
patents to impress not just commercial parties, but as a means to tell
their story to scientific peers, and even historians. Disclosure can be
the price the patentee pays, or the reward the patentee gets, a dual
role that deserves more attention in patent theory.
XXV. Need to Know
Trade secret law encourages secrecy-but also disclosure. In
order to claim trade secret protection in information, one must take
reasonable security measures: keeping track of copies of the
information, limiting access to places where the information is used,
limiting the disclosure of the information to those who require it.239
237. See JERRY COHEN & ALLEN GUTTERMAN, TRADE SECRETS: PROTECTION AND
EXPLOITATION (BNA Books 1998).
238. Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 636-37 (2002) (describing
how patents can serve to signal the strength of a company).
239. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii) (requiring reasonable security measures
for trade secret protection).
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Trade secret law does not encourage publicizing the information.
Once public, the information is no longer a trade secret.24 0
But it does encourage limited disclosure. A business with
valuable information, in addition to the practical security measures it
takes, receives legal protection for its trade secrets. If employees or
joint venture partners disclose the information, they will be liable. If
a competitor bribes an employee or hacks into the computer network,
the competitor will be liable. If the Chamberlen family business has a
valuable confidential manufacturing technique, they need not limit
the factory staff to trusted family members. They can use trade secret
law as one device to share the information. So trade secret law allows
expansion of the circle of those in the know, by protecting limited
disclosure. Like all forms of legal protection, trade secret is not
perfect. But it does make it more likely that certain types of
information will be shared. So, as with patent law, disclosure plays a
role in the underlying policy, beyond the basic policy of providing an
incentive to innovate.
It may be that thinking of disclosure helps us understand some of
the distinctions that courts have made. Multiple choice tests are trade
241 242secrets. Computer passwords are not. When addressing
borderline issues of trade secret protection, courts invoke the
requirement of "independent economic value." One way of giving
content to that phrase would be to look at how the information is
used. Multiple choice tests have no value without disclosure: the
people preparing, taking and grading need access to the test.
Passwords, by contrast, need not be shared within the firm. The best
practice is for a password to be known only to the individual that uses
it. Where passwords are used correctly, there is little need for legal
protection.
XXVI. Double Reverse Engineering
Faively developed brake friction cylinder tread break units, "that
loud squeaking, sparking braking system that so reliably stops the
New York City Transit subway system." 243 Faively kept the trade
240. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i). (providing for termination of trade secret if
disclosed to public).
241. See State ex rel. Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 123 Ohio St. 3d 410 (2009).
242. State Analysis, Inc. v American Financial Services Assoc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 309,
321 (E.D. Va. 2009).
243. Faiveley Transport Malmo Ab. v. WABTEC Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2009) (citing In re Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB, 522 F. Supp. 2d 639, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
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secret in the family, licensing it to a sister company, Wabtec, for
manufacture of the parts, allowing Wabtec limited access to Faively's
know-how and drawings.
The two companies moved to different corporate families, and
the joint venture ceased. Wabtec could no longer use Faiveley's trade
secrets. Independent creation of the same information is permitted
under trade secret law, so Wabtec decided to reverse engineer the
parts, using some specialists in reverse engineering. Despite
considerable efforts, attempts to duplicate the parts yielded no usable
drawings. Wabtec tried again, but this time included in the reverse
engineering team a Wabtec employee who had previously had access
to Faively's drawings and know-how. This time, things went more
smoothly, and Wabtec was able to produce competing parts. But
Faively obtained an injunction against Wabtec, the court concluding
that the reverse engineering effort was "fatally tainted."
The case is one of many where parties seize on a permissive rule
from intellectual property law and stretch it past the breaking point.
DNA is not copyrightable. Copyright applies to original works of
authorship, not molecules in cells. But one party that produced gene
sequences proposed protecting them as copyrightable musical works,
on the theory that the sequences could be interpreted as musical
notes.244  Another creative entity took the unsuccessful position in
litigation that it had not copied recordings of Beatles songs. Rather,
it had made "psycho-acoustic simulations" that sounded uncannily
similar.24 5 Parties have argued that they should not be liable for
infringement where they later get a license from a subsequent owner
of the intellectual property rights-as though the owner could go
back in time and grant a license.246
Intellectual property law is thought to provide incentives for
authors and inventors. It also provides incentives for creativity about
intellectual property law itself.
244. Willem P.C. Stemmer, How To Publish DNA Sequences With Copyright
Protection, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 217 (March 1, 2002).
245. See Eliot Van Buskirk & David Kravets, Judge Halts Online Sale of Beatles Songs,
WIRED (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/11/bluebeat-claims-to-own-
new-copyrights-to-old-beatles-songs/.
246. See Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting
argument that license from patent owner excused infringement that had occurred earlier
when patent was owned by a different party); see also Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.
2007) (rejecting argument that post-infringement license from joint author could negate
the other joint author's cause of action for copyright infringement).
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XXVII. Access Denied
The United States is a nation of laws:
badly written and randomly enforced.
In 1984, Congress passed the first federal statute that targeted
nefarious use of a computer.2 48 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(as renamed and amended several times)2 49 imposes civil and criminal
liability on anyone that causes damage by intentionally accessing a
computer without authorization. The statute addressed the threats
associated with the new technology by using two of the most flexible
words in the legal vocabulary, "access" and "authorize. ,25) Access
could mean simply communicating with a computer or could require
actually reading or writing information from the computer. It could
range from touching a computer's keyboard to using a telescope to
read the reflections of a screen in someone's eyes (a complex hack
which has proved feasible, if only from a few dozen feet away2'). If to
"access" a computer means to change the contents of its memory or
affect the functioning of its software, then taking a picture with a
phone would be accessing the computer in the phone. Indeed, having
your picture taken would be accessing the computer's memory, in a
broad sense. Any of those interpretations would be supportable for
access as either a legal term or a computing term. As to "authorize,"
an entire branch of common law, the law of agency, tries to flesh out
when parties have authority do things. Many other bodies of law
have other meanings for "authorize." The term has similar flexibility
as computer jargon.
The first CFAA conviction involved a grad student who devised
a worm that could write itself into computers on a network using
security flaws in email software, in the "finger demon" program
(which normally limited information in response to inquiries), and
trusted host programs, that allow use by designated computers.252
247. Widely attributed to Frank Zappa.
248. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. no. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008)) (amended in 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2008).
249. Id. See also Charlotte Decker, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the
United States Criminal Code to Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 959, 980 (2008).
250. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access' and 'Authorization' in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1604 (2003).
251. W. Wayt Gibbs, How Hackers Can Steal Secrets from Reflections, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (May 2009).
252. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d. Cir. 1991).
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Once inside, the worm would cause computers on the network to
duplicate and propagate the worm. In 1988, the student "released the
worm into INTERNET, which is a group of national networks that
connect university, governmental, and military computers around the
country."2 5 The worm quickly spread far and wide, crashing many
machines. The Second Circuit concluded that because the student
used the various programs on the computers in ways other than their
"intended function," he had "accessed" those machines "without
authorization." 254 If ever there was unauthorized access to computers,
that was it. But suggesting that use of software in a way that is
different from its "intended function" is "access" "without
authorization" opens up a broad range of applicability, because
creative people are always trying to get computers to do new things
(for better or worse). Constraints encourage creativity.
Creative lawyers soon started stretching the meaning of the
statute. Before quitting, an employee emailed his employer's
confidential business plan and trade secrets to his next employer. The
employee had authority to use the computer, but the court reasoned
that his breach of duty terminated his authorization, and so he
accessed the computer without authority.25 A breach was also found
where an ex-employee helped his new employer write a program that
accessed his former employer's website. None of the information
retrieved was confidential (and the program did not circumvent any
security measures). The court, however, reasoned that there was
unauthorized access because a clause in his first employment contract
prohibited the employee for using any of the company's information
against its interest.26
"Authority" could be lacking because software was not used as
intended, or under agency principles, or by breach of the contract
granting authority.27 "Access" could likewise be read to cover any
use of a computer, directly or over a network. This reading of those
two simple words made the CFAA's potential scope extremely broad.
Our use of networks is subject to any number of contracts. Someone
checking Facebook on their iPhone likely implicates their terms of
service agreement with Facebook, the phone service provider, and
253. Morris, 928 F.2d at 505.
254. Id.
255. Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
256. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
257. See Kerr, supra note 250.
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Apple. If they check their work messages, that also implicates access
to their employer's computer, subject to that agency relationship.
Multiply that by the many other contractual and agency relationships
implicated over the course of the day. It is unlikely that one would
not breach one of the hundreds of paragraphs in the terms of service
(even if they have never read them), or taken some steps not in their
principal's best interest. Other federal statutes can be equally broad.
The "theft of honest services," although used to prosecute perceived
breaches of duty by corporate or governmental officials, has become
flexible enough to make a violator of anyone who goes on a frolic or
detour when on payroll.2 58 Some figure that, given the breadth and
vagueness of federal statutes, a typical person might well commit
several theoretical felonies a day. 9
In United States v. Drew, defendant was convicted of a felony for
breaching MySpace's terms of service. The facts in Drew call for a
remedy. The defendant, acting with her teenage daughter and others,
created a fictitious MySpace profile of a boy. Some of the group,
pretending to be the boy, deceived and taunted the daughter's former
friend, who shortly thereafter committed suicide.26') Despite the name
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, defendant was not convicted
for using a computer to deceive the teenager. The act does not target
that sort of fraud. She was convicted, in effect, for breach of contract.
She violated MySpace's terms of service, which require users to
provide "truthful and accurate" information when registering for an
account. 261 That meant she made unauthorized access to MySpace's
computers.
Post-trial, the trial judge dismissed the charges. The court
reasoned that the statute has been read so broadly that it fails to give
the notice required by due process of what is prohibited by criminal
law.262 The spectre of substantial civil and criminal liability premised
only on breach of the terms of use of a website or software remains.
Ironically, the statute is too narrow in other respects to
encompass many types of computer fraud and abuse. Deceit using a
258. The Supreme Court has recently narrowed the construction of the "honest
services" provision in the context of nongovernmental defendants. See Skilling v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
259. HARVEY SILVERGATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE
INNOCENT (Encounter Books, 2009).
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computer with authority does not fall within the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, which is why Drew was not charged with deceiving the
girl, but with breaching her contract with MySpace. Mortgage
company employees who scrubbed company computer hard drives to
hide data theft nonetheless made authorized use of the computers.263
Fortunately, there remain many other statutes that address fraud and
abuse, with or without a computer.
XXVIII. Last First Sale
For intellectual property, the rights of attribution and control
have deep roots. For physical property, people instinctively feel an
attachment. One could argue that the USSR fell because its
economic system failed to account for the importance of property to
humans. As Frank Zappa succinctly put it, "Communism doesn't
work because people like to own stuff." Someone can own a piece of
stuff that embodies someone else's intellectual property. The
personal property owner would like to do whatever she wants with
her stuff, while the intellectual property owner would like to control
what happens with stuff embodying her protected ideas.
First sale has been a doctrine that struck a balance.264 Someone
that owns a copyrighted work (whether the original or an authorized
copy) can distribute it to the public or display it to the public,
notwithstanding the copyright owner's exclusive rights of public
display and distribution.265 The person cannot necessarily make more
copies, or adapt the work, or perform the work publicly, which rights
remain under the copyright owner's exclusive control.266 Patent and
trademark have similar rules, often travelling under the name
"exhaustion," the theory that sale of an authorized object exhausts
the rights in that particular object, but does not allow the buyer to
make more.
First sale, however, has been shrinking rapidly on several fronts.
Many works, especially software, are sold under license agreements
that provide, in effect: "We authorize you to use this work under the
following terms. We provide a copy, but the copy does not belong to
you." If those license terms are effective, then first sale does not
apply, because the licensee does not own the copy, merely possesses
263. Mortgage Now Inc. v. Stone, No. 3:09cv80/MCR/MD, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9887
(N.D. Fla.2009).
264. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2010).
265. Id.
266. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109 (2010).
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it. 267 Works in digital form may also be wrapped in copying and access
controls. Someone who owns a copy may nonetheless be unable
effectively to do anything other than what the copyright owner has
permitted. If they circumvent the controls, that may violate the anti-
circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 268
A more refined reduction in first sale comes from the increasing
internationalization of copyright law. The European Union, of late,
has pressed for wider recognition of rights for authors to control their
works' subsequent lives. The resale right, for example, requires that
artists receive a percentage of subsequent sales of their artworks.
Certain moral rights apply more broadly, limiting the ability of others
to modify works even where they hold the copyright.
For many copyright owners, case law on importation makes first
sale, as some have noted, optional. Someone that owns a "lawfully
made" copy may import it, because importation is included in the
definition of distribution. 26 9 But some courts have held that a copy
made outside the United States is not "lawfully made" under the
Copyright Act.m Courts reason, because it was made beyond the
reach of the Copyright Act, the copy is neither unlawfully made nor
lawfully made, even if authorized by the copyright owner. 271 if I
bought a painting overseas, and brought it into the U.S., I would
potentially infringe copyright if I sold it, or displayed it in public. In
fact, even importing it would potentially infringe. On a broader scale,
copyright owners may opt out of first sale. If foreign-made copies are
not subject to first sale, then a copyright owner could arrange for all
her books (or DVD's, or CD's, etc.) to be made outside the United
States and so not subject to first sale.
Intellectual property is statutory law, often dealing with fast-
changing technology. But intellectual property law often seems to
change in ways similar to the common law. The pressures on the first
sale doctrine push it to its logical extreme. As Cardozo put it: "Every
new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems
applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is
267. See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or 'Shrink- Wrapping') of
American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1999).
268. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2010).
269. See 17 U.S.C. H§ 109, 602(a) (2010); Quality King Distribs. v. L'Anza Research
Int'l, 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
270. See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
271. Id.
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reconsidered." 272 Where limits on first sale seem to eliminate people's
ownership of what they have "bought," there is the doctrinal pressure
Cardozo describes. Some lower courts have begun to reject these
forms of licensing agreements, and instead enforce them according to
their substance.2  Under this approach, if a party hands over a copy
of a work in exchange for a price, never expecting that copy back, the
transaction is a sale. 274 The Supreme Court has bolstered first sale in
the patent context, holding that it applies not just to patented
products, but products that use patented processes.27 The same
policies may be applied in copyright.276 Beyond the courts, the market
may likewise be responding. Apple began offering music DRM free
(for a higher price).
XXIX. Old Lines on New Bottles
Shrinkwrap and clickwrap contracts present one of the
thorniest current issues in contract law. 278 Enforcing the terms can be
problematic because the buyer often does not read or even have an
opportunity to read the terms before receiving the product. Not
enforcing the terms can be problematic because the alternative would
be to require laborious measures to ensure that buyers were aware at
least of the material terms of the contract before agreeing. Buyers
show by common conduct that they are willing to enter into
agreements without awareness of the specific terms of service; buyers
regularly check boxes and click through.
272. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23
(1921), (quoting MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909)).
273. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Wash. 2008)
(software reseller obtained declaratory judgment that first sale doctrine authorized resale
of software, after online auction delayed by take down notice, and after threats of further
action). The district court opinion, however, was reversed, suggesting that at least in the
Ninth Circuit, where software is delivered subject to a license it is not sold even if the copy
is paid for and never returned. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
18957 (9th Cir. 2010).
274. Id.
275. See Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
276. The tide may turn on the rule that first sale does not apply to imported copies,
even where authorized. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving the
issue. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010).
277. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Want to Copy iTunes Music? Go Ahead, Apple Says, NEW
YORK TIMES (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/technology/companies/
07apple.html?fta=y.
278. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239 (1995).
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One of the most controversial features of such contracts is their
restriction on first sale rights. Terms of use regularly prohibit resale
or otherwise impose limits on rights the purchaser would normally
have under first sale to distribute or display the work. There is
considerable disagreement among courts and commentators about
the enforceability of such provisions. Even the Uniform Commercial
Code has been drawn into the fray. States have all adopted the UCC,
making it the basic commercial law in the United States. Every
article of the UCC has been successfully updated, except for Article
2, which governs sales contracts. 279 The revision of Article 2 met the
unusual fate of being largely ignored by state legislatures. A key
reason is that it contained rules governing the enforceability of
shrinkwrap and clickwrap contracts, and there is not enough
consensus on what those rules should be. Shrink-wrap terms and
contract law would appear to be a cutting edge legal issue of
contemporary high technology law.
But it turns out that Thomas Edison used such terms on his
patented products. On the Edison Cylinder, an early sound recording
medium, Edison attempted to use unilateral terms to bind not just his
buyers, but also anyone down the line, to his resale price maintenance
rules:
Patented in Great Britain, Germany, France and other
Countries. This record is sold upon the condition that it shall
not be re-sold to or by any unauthorized dealer or used for
duplication, and that it shall not be sold, or offered for sale, by
the original, or any subsequent purchaser (except by authorized
jobber or factor to an authorized retail dealer) for less than 35
cents in the United States, nor in other countries for less than
the price given in the current Edison catalogues of the country
in which it is sold. Upon any breach of this condition, the
license to use and vend this record, implied from such sale,
immediately terminates.
Edison held some 1,093 U.S. patents. Had business methods
been patentable in his day, that number may have been greater.
279. William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J.
131 (2009) ("Article 2 is the only one of the original articles that has not been successfully
updated since the first widely adopted version of the U.C.C."); Fred H. Miller, Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2 On Sales of Goods and the Uniform Law Process: A True Story
of Good v. ?, 11 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 143 (2009).
280. Cory Doctorow, Thomas Edison's crappy, price-fixing EULA, BOINGBOING
(January 13, 2009), http://boingboing.net/2009/01/13/thomas-edisons-crapp.html.
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XXX. Pancopticon
At one time in the United States, copyright attached to a work of
authorship when it was published, provided it included the magical
copyright symbol, along with first year of publication and the
copyright owner's name, for example, "@ 1968 Arthur C. Clarke." 281
In order to harmonize its law with other jurisdictions, the United
States has shifted. Copyright now attaches when a work is first fixed
in tangible form.2 82 For a time, copyright could still be lost if the work
was later published without a copyright notice. Finally, the United
States dropped the requirement of a copyright notice.28 Copyright
now attaches to a work of authorship, as soon as it is fixed in some
tangible form.24 The last boundary of copyright became fixation.
At the same time, more and more is becoming fixed.
Increasingly, electronic devices capture sights and sounds from
everyday life. As YouTube demonstrates, security cameras often
record dramatic vignettes, from surprised kittens to railroad workers
narrowly escaping oncoming trains. Such footage could be
commercially valuable. In some cases, someone would like to have
the copyright in order to prevent distribution of the images.
Fixation now is less of a boundary, as recording devices become
ubiquitous. Other requirements to copyright may now move to the
fore. Copyright attaches only to a work of authorship made with at
least a minimal spark of creativity. " Mounting a security camera on a
loading dock or convenience store counter or parking garage may not
be held creative. But the requirement of creativity is extremely low.
In deciding which elements of the scene to capture, creative choices
could be made.
The same camera mounted by different people could give
different results. If a contractor routinely placed a security camera
four feet above every exit to a parking garage, the footage might be
held not to be a work of authorship. If an artist mounted the same
camera in the same alley to capture the occurrences over the course
of a year, that would be well above the line of a "minimal spark of
creativity." So the state of mind is everything, as in the Artificial
Intelligence Koan:
281. See Copyright Act of 1909, §21; Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., v. CBS, 194
F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).
282. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 401 (2010).
284. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
285. See Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
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A novice was trying to fix a broken Lisp machine by turning the
power off and on. Knight, seeing what the student was doing,
spoke sternly: "You cannot fix a machine by just power-cycling
it with no understanding of what is going wrong." Knight
turned the machine off and on. The machine worked .6
The question will also arise of the ownership of such copyrights.
If the camera trained on a motel's swimming pool caught a movie star
tossing her spouse in the deep end, the owner of the copyright could
get considerable licensing revenue. Several parties might claim
authorship: the motel, which chose the spot and hired someone to
install the camera; the contractor, who may have made choices about
the field of view and how to account for changing light conditions; the
worker, who actually installed the camera.
Perhaps contracts, which address all kinds of contingencies, will
now provide for the possible windfall of some valuable video. A
boilerplate clause might address both originality and
ownership: "Beverly Hills Camera Co. installs the equipment subject
to this contract with artistic intent. Buyer agrees that any copyright to
this work will belong to Beverly Hills Camera." We will agree that
everything we do is the subject of a work of authorship.
XXXI. Social Register
A high tech client might ask her lawyer how to register the
copyright in the firm's software overseas. The client had already
secured patents abroad. The Patent Cooperation Treaty makes that
easier, permitting inventors to file an international application in one
patent office, which will then be sent on and converted into
applications in the countries designated.287 For trademarks, The
Madrid Protocol has likewise simplified things, permitting registration
of a mark to trigger registrations abroad.28 But for copyrights in a
foreign jurisdiction, the answer, generally, is that there is no place to
file. The United States is unique in having a copyright office for
286. ERIC RAYMOND, THE NEW HACKER'S DICTIONARY (The MIT Press 3d ed.
1996).
287. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 351-376 (2010); Jerome H. Reichman & R. Cooper Dreyfuss,
Harmonization without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent
Law Treaty, 57 DUJKE L.J. 85, 88 (2007) ("The Patent Cooperation Treaty and various
regional agreements, such as the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, embody
many important procedural advances.").
288. See 15 U.S.C. § 1141 (2010).
MCJOHN (Do NOT DELETE) 11/20/2010 1:16 PM
WINTER 2011] THIRTY-TWO SHORT STORIES 63
registering copyrights, taking deposit of copies of copyrighted works,
and recording transactions (such as grants of a copyright as
collateral). The vast majority of countries have no Copyright Office
at all, and the few that do have a much simpler version than the
United States.
Copyright springs into life as soon as a work is created.289
Registration is not necessary to have a copyright under United States
law-unless you want the copyright to have any weight. First,
infringement of an unauthorized copyright does not give a right to
statutory damages, instead limits the plaintiff to actual damages.29
Second, one is required to register the copyright before bringing an
infringement action. So although one can recover damages for
infringement of an unregistered copyright, you must register in order
to file suit.29' Registration matters.
But registration has increasingly less value for disclosure of
works. For patents and trademarks, registration has created a
database of considerable value. Patents provide disclosure of
inventions. That means future applicants cannot claim similar
inventions, or ones that existing patents (along with other work in the
field) make obvious. Patents also provide a trove of information for
competitors seeking to keep up in the field (not to mention avoiding
infringement, and plotting their own patent portfolio), researchers in
technology (ranging from scientists to historians).292 Patent searching
is an art of its own. Once patents were available by getting a copy
mailed from the USPTO, although abstracts were available in local
libraries. But now patents are freely available online.
The trademark register likewise receives a great deal of
attention, for legal practice and many other purposes. Before
choosing a mark, a wise entrepreneur searches the register to clear
the possibility of confusingly similar marks. Nevertheless, such a
search requires imagination. Someone considering using FINDER as
289. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 et seq. (2010)
290. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2010).
291. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2010). The Supreme Court has taken cert. in a case raising
the issue, whether the requirement of registration before instituting an infringement action
goes to subject matter jurisdiction. See Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, No. 08-103, 2010 U.S.
LEXIS 2202 (2010).
292. See, e.g., B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS
AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, 1790-1920 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2005) (economic analysis of thousands of patents to study the role of
intellectual property in economic development of the early United States).
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a mark for a memory boosting drug would have to look out for marks
similar in sight (FINER, FINDER'S KEEPERS), sound
(PHYNDUH, OFFENDER), or meaning (DISCOVERER,
LABRADOR). As with patents, the comprehensive trademark
register may be searched online.
Like the USPTO, the records of the Copyright Office may be
searched online. But there is less reason to search the copyright
records. People can search the patent and trademark records to find
out what is protected. The trademark register shows the registered
marks. The patent records provide the patent claims (which state the
extent of patent protection), along with a specification that describes
how to make and use the invention, often with drawings. So patent
and trademark searches are regularly done (to avoid infringement, to
figure out what can yet be patented or trademarked, to keep tabs on
the competition, etc.). But copyright is different. First, unlike patent
and trademark, copyright infringement requires copying. So if an
author writes a book that happens to be similar to a copyrighted
book, she is not liable. An inventor that develops and sells something
that someone else already patented, by contrast, infringes that patent,
as does the seller who innocently uses a symbol confusingly similar to
an existing mark.
More important, the copyright records do not tell us what is
protected. The records will list the name of the author and title of the
book. But the book itself is not in the searchable records. Unlike
copyright and patent, registration does not make the intellectual
property's content easily accessible to the public. If an author was
working on a book, song, or dance, she cannot search the records to
see if someone has already done something similar. The copyright
records are just a bare bones notice filing system, of considerably less
practical importance. The copyright holder must register to be
eligible for statutory damages and attorney's fees, and must register
before suing for infringement-but whether she registers is much less
likely to be something others will search to find out.
In addition to registration, the copyright owner must deposit
copies of the work.29 The deposit requirement has many exceptions.
Deposit is excused in whole or in part for software, for material with
trade secrets, for secure multiple choice tests (in some cases, secured
tests are deposited but then returned). The deposit requirement
allows the Copyright Office to examine the work to see whether it is
293. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2010).
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deserving of copyright. In practice, few works receive a thorough
examination. Under the Rule of Doubt, registration is allowed unless
the work is clearly not copyrightable.294 So there is not a class of civil
servants paid to listen to music and read books all day in
contemplation. The office issues registration at speed-but
nevertheless has a gigantic backload, due to the ever increasing
number of items being registered. All those deposited copies have
given the Library of Congress one of the largest collections on earth,
even though the library retains only some permanently. One can visit
the library and look at copies, but not check them out. So unlike
patents and trademarks, which are freely accessible online, only some
deposited copies of copyrighted works are available, and only by
going to Washington, D.C.
The copyright records could be something that everyone would
search. Copyright owners are now encouraged to deposit works in
electronic form. Those works could be put into a searchable
copyright database. But there is little chance of such a free,
government-provided Kindle-iTunes-Netflix-a singular provider.
Copyright provides an incentive for authors to create works. Authors
are required to send copies to the Copyright Office and Library of
Congress-who are required, in digital terms, to keep them locked
away.
XXXII. Shifting Sands
Artist Christoph Buchel conceived an art installation, "Training
Ground for Democracy." 29 5 Visitors would walk, climb, and train in
"a movie theater, a house, a bar, a mobile home, various sea
containers, a bomb carousel, and an aircraft fuselage." 29 6 Buchel
completed part of the installation at the Massachusetts Museum of
Contemporary Art. The artist and museum, however, fell out before
the work was complete. The museum continued work and proposed
permitting visitors in while the work remained in unfinished form
(perhaps covering its elements with a tarpaulin), Buchel sued for
infringement of copyright and of moral rights. Most works in the
United States are not protected with moral rights, but moral rights do
294. See Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007) (upholding decision of
Copyright Office to deny registration to public domain map with colors added).
295. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 2010).
296. Id. at 44.
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apply to works of visual art.297  The case raised thorny conflicts
between the artist's moral rights and the museum's right to use its
space, and materials that it had worked with Buchel to install. The
statute contemplates works like paintings and sculpture, and so would
require artful interpretation in a new artistic context. The trial court
resolved the matter by holding that the artist's rights of attribution
and integrity of the work would not be infringed by display of the
work in incomplete form. That avoided the more difficult
interpretive issues-but would raise serious issues in future cases.
There would be a moral hazard if others could copy (or modify, or
misattribute, etc.) works as long as they acted before the artist had
finished. The appellate court held that unfinished works are
protected, and remanded the case.298
We commonly discuss the difficulties for intellectual property
law in adjusting to rapidly changing technology.99 Art, constrained
only by imagination and often driven by challenging received ideas,
can change the law's preconceptions in other ways.
XXXIII. Internet, Circa 1967
The law must adjust to changes in society and its technology.
With respect to copyright especially, it is often said that the statute
was written for books and music and did not contemplate today's
networked world. The Internet is a world-wide machine for making
and distributing copies, putting a new light on the exclusive rights of
an author to make and distribute copies of a work (not to mention to
display, adapt, and perform a work, all of which can be done with the
Internet). But we can exaggerate how unforeseeable our times were.
Benjamin Kaplan wrote his 1967 book, An Unhurried View of
Copyright ,. while he was a major influence in drafting what
eventually became the Copyright Act of 1976. In addition to a
297. See 17 U.S.C. §106A (2010).
298. See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 38.
299. See, e.g., David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests And Copyright
Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. Rev 1393, 1406 (2009) ("Much ink has been spilled and many
pixels lighted detailing the powerful changes computers, cheap memory, digitization, the
Internet, and increasing broadband adoption have wrought in the way that content is
created and copyright enforcement challenged."); Mary L. Mills, Note, New Technology
and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright
Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV 307 (1989)
(describing challenges copyright law faces in light of changing technologies).
300. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (Columbia
University Press 1967).
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nuanced history of copyright and discussion of the policy issues in
1967, Kaplan analyzed how copyright law would have to adapt to a
future worldwide computer network with multi-media capabilities."
His vision of a Web is closer to reality than other, more recent
futuristic conjectured cyberspaces:
You must imagine, at the eventual heart of things to come,
linked or integrated systems or networks of computers capable
of storing faithful simulacra of the entire treasure of the
accumulated knowledge and artistic production of past ages,
and of taking into the store new intelligence of all sorts as
produced." 312
Kaplan foresaw many of today's issues. The ease with which one
can copy, adapt and distribute works raises a tension with the "'moral
rights' of authors to prevent abuses in the exploitation of their
creations."" He likewise spoke of the need to encourage a
registration system where authors could submit their works in a form
permitting indexing, abstracting, storage and retrieval3114 -an area
where the Copyright Office has noticeably fallen behind. It would no
longer be necessary to publish academic material in "a m6lange of
learned journals and in the output of university presses.""" Such
material would be available online-both manuscripts that had been
accepted for "publication" and those that had not.3" For more
commercial works, there would likely be two phases: an initial broad
commercialization phase, followed by a secondary phase, with what
would now be called digital rights management systems: "book-
keeping apparatus that can continue for the whole copyright period to
bill the customers monthly or weekly," while "preventing
unconsented-to private copying of works." 307 There would be issues
about how such systems would be administered, and whether the
government would have a role to play. 8 All that foreshadows such
301. KAPLAN, supra note 300, at 119-24.
302. Id. at 119.
303. Id. at 120.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 120-21.
307. KAPLAN, supra note 300, at 122-23.
308. Id.
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controversies as the Google Book Project, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act's legal protections for anti-copying technology,3a and
the ongoing negotiations for amendments to copyright treaties to deal
with issues of media "piracy. "' Kaplan also saw issues with respect
to "automatic translation, in world-wide networks.",12 Here perhaps
he was too generous to the coming decades. Software translation of
natural language has proved far more difficult that early researchers
in artificial intelligence expected.
So today's copyright issues were not unforeseen. Kaplan offered
few solutions to them. The one concrete proposition he made was
general: that the United States should seek to harmonize its copyright
law with other nations. He cited in particular the differing treatment
that United States law has accorded foreign authors, a lingering issue.
In one respect, harmonization has become a little easier since 1967.
At that time, one superpower, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, did not recognize private property like copyright.
309. Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything
and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV.1799 (2007).
310. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2010) (containing anti-circumvention provisions, added
to the Copyright Act in 1998 and provide new protections to copyright holders).
311. See Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247 (2009); Charles McManis, The Proposed Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Two Tales of a Treaty, 46 HOuS. L. REV. 1235 (2009).
312. KAPLAN, supra note 300.
313. See, e.g., HAL'S LEGACY: 2001'S COMPUTER AS DREAM AND REALITY (David G.
Stork, ed. 1997).
